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INTRODUCTION

The killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers in May
2020 put the issue of police reform back into the national discussion and
made Minnesota, 1 at least during a brief window of time, confront its past
on issues of racism and police abuse. 2 The video showing Mr. Floyd

Professor of Law at Mitchell Hamline School of Law and Ad Hoc Counsel to the
Minnesota-Dakota State Conference of the NAACP. The contents of this article represent
my own personal views and not the views of either institution. This article builds from the
testimony I presented in June 2020 at the Minnesota Legislature during a special legislative
session to consider police reform legislation. I would like to thank Yusef Mgeni and
Professors Mike Steenson and Angelique EagleWoman for their helpful comments and
encouragement. I would also like to thank Emily Gullickson and Elizabeth Plaine for their
excellent research assistance.
National discussions on racism and police reform go back at least a century. As Dr. Kenneth
Clark observed more than fifty years ago while testifying to the Kerner Commission:
ǂ

1

I read that report . . . of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were
reading the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of
1935, the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of
1943, the report of the McCone Commission on the Watts riot. I must
again in candor say to you members of this Commission—it is a kind of
Alice in Wonderland with the same moving picture reshown over and
over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same
inaction.

U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION
ON
CIVIL
DISORDERS 265
(1968),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015000225410&view=1up&seq=287
[https://perma.cc/JKY3-8ELM].
As the national press recognized, “The Twin Cities area has been an outsized part of the
dialogue about the police use of force.” Jelani Cobb, The Death of George Floyd, in Context,
NEW YORKER (May 28, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-deathof-george-floyd-in-context [https://perma.cc/KZW7-RBLJ] (recounting past police killings in
2
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pleading for his life while a Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck
became an unprecedented catalyst for outrage. 3 Even in the midst of the
COVID-19 pandemic, massive protests and civil unrest spread from
Minneapolis to all over the world. 4
Nationwide demonstrations and media attention put pressure on
policymakers and police departments to make substantial changes. Police
reform efforts appeared at every level of government. For instance, the New
York Police Department announced that it would disband its notorious
plainclothes anti-crime unit. 5 Likewise, a majority of the Minneapolis City
Council vowed to “begin the process of ending the Minneapolis Police
Department.” 6 By summer’s end, Iowa, Delaware, Utah, and Nevada passed
Minnesota); see also infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text (discussing two of the most
significant events in Minnesota history).
Within six weeks of the killing, nearly ten percent of Americans reported participating in
demonstrations over the death of Mr. Floyd and others. Jugal K. Patel, Quoctrung Bui, &
Larry Buchanan, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floydprotests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/EG7B-3E7J]. By early July 2020, more than 40%
of all counties in the United States had at least one protest related to the killing. Id.
See generally Borzou Daragahi, Why the George Floyd Protests Went Global, ATL.
COUNCIL (June 10, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/george-floydprotests-world-racism/ [https://perma.cc/C74Y-FZRF] (“Solidarity marches and gatherings
took place from Sydney to Beirut to Istanbul to London to Berlin. . . . [R]arely if ever has
one incident inspired such a broad global movement. Attention has focused not just on the
United States and its abuses but also on entire systems of power, racism, and oppression,
which have come under scrutiny and criticism in what amounts to a global teach-in.”).
Ali Watkins, N.Y.P.D. Disbands Plainclothes Units Involved in Many Shootings, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/nyregion/nypd-plainclothescops.html [https://perma.cc/A6BH-M4LW]. As Commissioner of Police Dermot Shea
acknowledged, “the anti-crime units were a vestige of the city’s era of ‘stop-and-frisk,’ when
officers routinely searched people in high-crime areas, a practice that a judge declared
unconstitutional after finding it disproportionately affected [P]eople of [C]olor.” Id.; see also
George Joseph & Lilam Quigley, Plainclothes NYPD Cops Are Involved in a Staggering
Number of Killings, THE INTERCEPT (May 9, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/05/09/saheed-vassell-nypd-plain-clothes/
[https://perma.cc/9KT6-D398] (“[P]lainclothes officers, estimated to be around 6 percent
of the force, account for 31 percent of all fatal shooting incidents.”).
Liz Navratil, Most of Minneapolis City Council Pledges to ‘Begin the Process of Ending’
Police Department, STAR TRIB. (June 8, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.startribune.com/mplscouncil-majority-backs-dismantling-police-department/571088302/ [https://perma.cc/4LAFB8X8]. The Council also voted unanimously to submit a proposal to voters to abolish the
police department and create a new “Department of Community Safety and Violence
Prevention.” Liz Navratil, Minneapolis City Council Votes Unanimously for Proposal that
Could Replace Police Department, STAR TRIB. (June 27, 2020, 3:49 PM),
https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-city-council-votes-unanimously-for-proposal-thatcould-replace-police-department/571504662/ [https://perma.cc/P5CB-B8X3]; see also
Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance Amending Article VII of the City Charter Relating to
Administration and Article VIII of the City Charter Relating to Officers and Other
Employees, Pertaining to the Creation of a New Charter Department to Provide for
3

4

5

6
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legislation banning choke holds, 7 and Colorado enacted broad changes that
could serve as a model for Minnesota and other states. 8 Meanwhile, the
United States House of Representatives passed a bipartisan bill that
“mark[ed] one of the most comprehensive efforts in modern times to reimagine law enforcement departments across the country.” 9
In Minnesota, Governor Tim Walz called a special session of the
Minnesota Legislature less than two weeks after Mr. Floyd’s killing to
Community Safety and Violence Prevention, and the Removal of the Police Department as
a
Charter
Department
1–2
(June
27,
2020),
https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/File/3882/MPD%20Charter%20Amendment%
20Articles%20VII%20and%20Article%20VIII.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JMY-FLT7]
(proposing the removal of the police department).
Legislative Responses for Policing–State Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/legislative-responses-for-policing.aspx [https://perma.cc/TRN4-CYUS]; Sam Metz,
Nevada Passes Policing Bills, Including a Ban on Chokeholds, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 1,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/legislature-nevada-police-police-reform-minneapolis4338a49fb5281132520df77392f0872f [https://perma.cc/ZP8K-DSYJ]. More than 375 bills
on police reform were introduced in thirty-two states in the two months following Floyd’s
death. Holly Bailey & Timothy Bella, Police Reform Bill Passed by Minnesota Legislature
Doesn’t Go Far Enough, Critics Say, WASH. POST (July 22, 2020, 10:05 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-reform-bill-passed-by-minnesotalegislature-doesnt-go-far-enough-critics-say/2020/07/21/3d23b602-cba7-11ea-91f128aca4d833a0_story.html [https://perma.cc/7VU7-UJNC]. “‘This kind of rapid response from
legislators, on this type of issue particularly, is not something I’ve ever seen previously,’ [said] Amber
Widgery, a program principal on criminal justice issues at the National Conference of State
Legislatures.” Alan Suderman, States Race to Pass Policing Reforms After George Floyd’s
Death, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 8, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.startribune.com/states-race-topass-policing-reforms-after-floyd-s-death/572051772/ [https://perma.cc/6MBR-G5QA].
See Jesse Paul & Jennifer Brown, Colorado Governor Signs Sweeping Accountability Bill
into Law. Here’s How It Will Change Law Enforcement, COLO. SUN (June 19, 2020, 9:53
AM), https://coloradosun.com/2020/06/19/colorado-police-accountability-bill-becomes-law/
[https://perma.cc/KKB5-D9SP]; see also infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text
(describing the Colorado legislation and its potential application in Minnesota).
Claudia Grisales, House Approves Police Reform Bill, but Issue Stalled Amid Partisan
Standoff,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(June
25,
2020,
8:44
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/25/883263263/house-approves-police-reform-bill-but-issuestalled-amid-partisan-standoff [https://perma.cc/95PJ-TVLB]. The media considered the
House bill “the most sweeping federal intervention into law enforcement in years.” Cate
Edmondson, House Passes Sweeping Policing Bill Targeting Racial Bias and Use of Force,
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/politics/house-policeoverhaul-bill.html [https://perma.cc/PMA6-CY8Z]. Unfortunately, and not surprisingly, the
Senate did not accept the House bill, and instead proposed its own bill that Democrats found
“so threadbare and lacking in substance that it does not even provide a proper baseline for
negotiations.” Letter from Cory A. Booker, U.S. Sen., Kamala D. Harris, U.S. Sen., and
Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Sen., to Mitch McConnell, U.S. Sen. Majority Leader 1 (June 23,
2020),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Booker,%20Harris,%20Schumer%20Letter
%20to%20McConnell.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX3P-J8WU].
7

8

9
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address “the need for systemic police accountability and reform in
Minnesota.” 10 However, despite promises for “sweeping changes,” the
legislature failed to reach an agreement during the first special session. 11
During the second special session, however, approximately one month later,
legislators found more success. After weeks of negotiations, the legislature
overwhelmingly passed perhaps the most expansive police reforms in the
state’s history and substantially more than any other state had accomplished
up to that point, other than Colorado. 12 The new legislation included: a
statewide ban on choke holds; including the kind of neck restraint used on Mr.
Floyd; a prohibition on warrior-style training for officers; enhanced data
collection around deadly force encounters; a requirement that officers intervene
when witnessing excessive force by other officers; and the creation of a new state
unit to investigate police killings, among other changes. 13
The final reform bill, however, left considerable work to be done,
particularly given the depth of policing problems in Minnesota. Governor Walz
acknowledged that the law was “only the beginning” and that “[t]he work

TIM WALZ, GOV. OF MINN., PROCLAMATION FOR SPECIAL SESSION 2020 (June 10, 2020),
https://mn.gov/governor/assets/06.10.2020%20Special%20Session%20Proclamation%20fin
al_tcm1055-435510.pdf [https://perma.cc/D534-KMLD].
Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Jack Healy, Minnesota Lawmakers Vowed Police Reform.
They
Couldn’t
Agree
on
Any,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
20,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/us/minnesota-police-george-floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/A9F7-LD9P]. Not only was Minnesota the “focal point for nationwide fury
and grief over police killings and racism,” it was also the only one in the country where
Democrats control one chamber and Republicans the other. Id. “State lawmakers’ initial
efforts to pass police reform collapsed weeks earlier amid partisan bickering between
Democrats who called on lawmakers to embrace the urgency of the moment vs. Republicans
who accused them of trying to defund the police.” Bailey & Bella, supra note 7.
Briana Bierschbach, Minnesota Lawmakers Pass Sweeping Package of Police
Accountability
Measures,
STAR
TRIB.
(July
21,
2020,
4:18
PM),
https://www.startribune.com/state-lawmakers-strike-deal-on-police-reformproposals/571833891/ [https://perma.cc/Z4AZ-RFFT] (reporting the House approved the
measure 102 to 29, and the Senate passed it 60 to 7); see also Bailey & Bella, supra note 7
(“Supporters described the legislation that was passed as the most expansive criminal justice
reforms in the state’s history.”). As Minnesota Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington
said, “When I look at the laws that have been passed in other states for police reform, most of it
comes down to banning chokeholds and some duty to intervene . . . I think this is far broader and
goes far deeper than that. I think we did really good work.” Jennifer Bjorhus & Torey Van Oot,
Responses to Minnesota’s Police Reforms Range from Lukewarm to ‘Slap in the Face’, STAR
TRIB. (July 22, 2020, 12:34 AM), https://www.startribune.com/reactions-to-police-reformsgo-from-lukewarm-to-slap-in-face/571853831/ [https://perma.cc/K324-5FFP].
See Bierschbach, supra note 12 (detailing the bill’s provisions). The new legislation also
“boosts funding for crisis intervention training, creates a panel of expert arbitrators to handle police
misconduct cases, and establishes incentives for officers to live in the communities they police.” Id.
10

11

12

13
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does not end today.” 14 Many legislators considered the bill only a first step. 15
Indeed, the final bill represented significant compromises from the initial
proposals considered by the House of Representatives. 16 Several lawmakers
publicly declared that the bill was “insufficient” but voted for it anyway. 17
Others raised concern about the lack of public input and the nature of the
final negotiations. 18 Many community leaders criticized the legislation and
spoke out for further action. 19
The legislation passed last summer reflects both the speed with
which legislators acted and the substantial amount of work still left to be
done. In the past, Minnesota has shown its capacity to respond to shocking
acts of violence with strong legislation. Almost exactly one hundred years
before Mr. Floyd’s killing, three African American men, Elias Clayton,
Elmer Jackson, and Isaac McGhie, were lynched by a mob of thousands of
White people in Duluth while police stood by and failed to do anything to
stop them, having ignored clear warnings of the planned lynchings from
earlier in the day. 20 Within one year, the Minnesota Legislature responded
with arguably the strongest anti-lynching legislation in the United States at
the time, becoming one of the first states to ban lynching altogether. 21 Now,
Bailey & Bella, supra note 7.
State Rep. Rena Moran, the DFL co-chairwoman of the People of Color and Indigenous
(POCI) Caucus at the Legislature promised, “It is only the beginning.” Bjorhus & Van Oot,
supra note 12.
Bailey & Bella, supra note 7 (“Democrats dropped several items they had pursued,
including the restoration of voting rights to felons and a measure that would have put the
state attorney general in charge of prosecuting police killings.”).
Id. According to State Sen. Jeff Hayden, “‘While this bill sets the groundwork for the work
that we know needs to continue after this, the conversation cannot and will not end there
with the passage of this bill . . . There’s a lot of work to protect [B]lack bodies.’” Id.
Sen. Hayden also raised concerns about how the final bill was negotiated, stating that there
could have been more conversation on policing legislation: “‘Instead we got a closed-door
deal in the middle of the night with no public input,’ he said.” Walker Orenstein & Peter
Callaghan, The Legislature Just Passed a Police Reform Bill. What It Does—and Doesn’t
Do—to Reshape Law Enforcement in Minnesota, MINNPOST (July 21, 2020),
https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2020/07/the-legislature-just-passed-a-policereform-bill-what-it-does-and-doesnt-do-to-reshape-law-enforcement-in-minnesota/
[https://perma.cc/K9MM-5GA2].
Steven Belton, President and CEO of the Urban League Twin Cities, felt that “this
legislation represents the low-hanging fruit, . . . [but we have] richer, higher fruit that needs
to be harvested.” Bjorhus & Van Oot, supra note 12. Local civil rights leader and President
of Communities United Against Police Brutality Michelle Gross called the bill “mediocre”
with “a lot of extra garbage that we don’t need.” Id.
The Executive Committee, NAACP Stands for Justice, NAACP DULUTH, MN BRANCH
(June 4, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://duluthnaacp.org/news/9016060 [https://perma.cc/7NE6VH6M]; see also Ann Juergens, Lena Olive Smith: A Minnesota Civil Rights Pioneer, 28
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 397, 417 (2001).
See Juergens, supra note 20, at 417; see also Meagan Flynn, Century after Minnesota
Lynchings, Black Man Convicted of Rape ‘Because of His Race’ up for Pardon, WASH.
14
15

16

17

18

19

20

21
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the State of Minnesota must answer the call again to confront what has
happened in the hundred years since then.
The century between the anti-lynching bill and last summer’s
legislation was largely marked by decades of inaction, while police violence
and abuse of power went largely unabated. 22 In fact, over the past several
years, being killed by the police has become a leading cause of death
amongst young men of color. 23 Nearly 200 people in Minnesota were killed
by the police between 2000 and 2020. 24 And yet, “the cycle of police brutality
and racism has been met with cosmetic tinkering instead of substantive
structural change.” 25 The public protests in Minnesota and nationwide were
a response not only to unjust policing of marginalized communities in
particular, they “are a cry for action to public officials for real change, writ
large.” 26

POST. (June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/12/duluthlynchings-mason-pardon/ [https://perma.cc/N6SS-8F9V] (exploring the history of the Duluth
lynchings and their aftermath, including the NAACP Duluth office and anti-lynching
legislation); Michael J. Nolan, Defendant, Lynch Thyself: A California Appellate Court Goes
from the Sublime to the Ridiculous in People v. Anthony J., 4 HOW. SCROLL: SOC. JUST. L.
REV. 53, 69–70 (2001) (providing a historical review of state anti-lynching legislation).
See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text (describing the past several decades of
multiple studies and little actual reform).
Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee, & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of
Force in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.
OF
SCI. 16793,
16796
(Aug.
2019),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6708348/ [https://perma.cc/99P7-78DV]
(“Police violence is a leading cause of death for young men, and young Men of Color face
exceptionally high risk of being killed by police.”); see also Amina Khan, Getting Killed by
Police Is a Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men in America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16,
2019),
https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2019-08-15/police-shootings-are-a-leadingcause-of-death-for-black-men [https://perma.cc/8P4Y-87NA] (reporting that Black men and
boys are 2.5 times more likely than White men and boys to die during an encounter with
police officers).
Jeff Hargarten, Jennifer Bjorhus, MaryJo Webster, & Kelly Smith, Every Police-Involved
Death in Minnesota Since 2000, STAR TRIB. (updated Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/fatal-police-encounters-since-2000/502088871/
[https://perma.cc/AMQ3-7FY9] (database of all who have “died after a physical confrontation
with law enforcement in Minnesota since January 2000” through October 2, 2020).
Letter from Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. to U.S. House of Rep. and U.S. Sen.
Leaders
1
(June
1,
2020),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2020/Coalition_Letter_to_House_and_Senate_
Leadership_on_Federal_Policing_Priorites_Final_6.1.20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7XATWBU].
Id. (including nearly 500 national organizations’ signatures, along with the NAACP).
22
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While there are many tools available for police reform, 27 this article
focuses on options available to the Minnesota State Legislature. 28 The legal
system, in general, has fallen short of its obligations to curb police violence
in three ways. First, federal civil rights laws designed to incentivize better
police behavior and provide remedies to victims of police abuse have been
deeply undermined by the United States Supreme Court. 29 In particular, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “§ 1983”), 30 “the primary weapon used by civil
Other options could include political structures, such as civilian review boards;
technological advances, like body cameras; and structural reforms, such as recalibrating
police budgets to provide more social workers. See generally PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON
21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM6R-FEZZ] [hereafter PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING] (explaining how President Obama charged the task force with
“identifying best practices and offering recommendations on how policing practices can
promote effective crime reduction while building public trust”); POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F.,
GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
ON
USE
OF
FORCE
5
(2016),
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WJ5V-VJMU] [hereafter PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES] (compiling the
“latest thinking on police use-of-force issues from the perspective of many of the nation’s
leading police executives”); LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., NEW ERA OF PUBLIC
SAFETY: A GUIDE TO FAIR, SAFE, AND EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY POLICING, at xvii (2019),
https://civilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Policing_Full_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T27Y-VX4X] (explaining that the report “draws from the policies and
practices of departments across the country that have adopted innovative reforms, informed
by experience, community feedback, and expert advice, to address long-standing
challenges”).
Reform at the police department level can be important, but state-wide change is necessary.
The issues are not just about the Minneapolis Police or the metropolitan area. Over the past
five years, sixty percent of more than 100 cases regarding excessive use of force that resulted in
death or injury took place outside the metro area. See Briana Bierschbach, George Floyd Killing
Triggers Examination of Minnesota Law on Police Deadly Force, STAR TRIB. (June 17,
2020, 10:24 PM), https://www.startribune.com/floyd-killing-triggers-examination-ofminnesota-law-on-police-deadly-force/571329622/ [https://perma.cc/7K83-JW8R] (citing
Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington). From 2007 to 2017, Minnesota
jurisdictions across the State made over 900 payouts to citizens for alleged misconduct
totaling over $60 million, and the number is increasing from an average of fifty payouts per
year to nearly 100 payouts per year. Randy Furst & MaryJo Webster, Minnesota Cities,
Counties Paid $60.8 Million in Police Misconduct Claims in Past Decade, STAR TRIB. (April
15, 2018, 7:43 AM), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-cities-counties-paid-60-8m-inpolice-misconduct-claims-in-past-decade/479781413/ [https://perma.cc/728V-BBEB].
See infra notes 158–85 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s efforts
undermining § 1983); see also Hon. Lynn Adelman, The Erosion of Civil Rights and What
to Do About it, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) (“The Supreme Court, however, under Chief
Justices Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts, has been dominated by
conservatives for almost half a century and, since Monroe, the Court has been hostile to the
statute, continuously narrowing it and imposing restrictions on civil rights plaintiffs.”).
Section 1983 provides in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
27

28

29
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rights lawyers to remedy police abuse,” 31 has been the subject of incremental
attacks from the Court for sixty years. Specifically, the judicially-constructed
doctrine of “qualified immunity”—a concept not specifically mentioned in
the text of § 1983 32—has expanded to the point of nearly swallowing whole
any chances plaintiffs once had of vindicating rights under § 1983. 33
Second, in those cases that actually impose civil liability on officers
who abuse their power, the deterrent effects of § 1983 have been undercut
by a second development: the near-universal indemnification of police
officers by taxpayers. 34 Even if officers are found guilty of § 1983 violations
in civil court and ordered to pay damages, the officers often pay nothing at
all. 35 Regardless of how egregious their violations of constitutional law,
officers face little or no financial consequence whatsoever. 36
Third, hardly any officers are ever charged, much less convicted,
in cases of police-involved killings. 37 State criminal laws still lag behind what
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1996).
Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in
Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1504 (1993).
The Court itself acknowledged that the text of § 1983 has no explicit mention of any
immunities. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163 (1992) (“§ 1983 creates a species of tort
liability that on its face admits of no immunities.”); see also infra notes 164–85 and
accompanying text (explaining the origin and development of qualified immunity in § 1983
jurisprudence).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supremecourt-protects-bad-cops.html [https://perma.cc/9PDY-5VSE] (“[T]he [C]ourt has made it
very difficult, and often impossible, to hold police officers and the governments that employ
them accountable for civil rights violations. This undermines the ability to deter illegal police
behavior and leaves victims without compensation. When the police kill or injure innocent
people, the victims rarely have recourse.”).
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 961 (2014) (reporting
the results of her nationwide study of police departments and concluding that “officers are
virtually always indemnified” for judgments and settlements).
Id. at 890 (finding that “governments satisfied settlements and judgments in full even when
officers were disciplined or terminated by the department or criminally prosecuted for their
conduct”).
Id. at 923. One example is particularly telling. The City of Denver paid $885,000 to settle
a lawsuit where one of its officers stomped on the back of a teenage boy while using a fence
for leverage, breaking his ribs and causing him to suffer kidney damage and a lacerated liver.
Id. Although the officer was criminally charged (and acquitted), the city covered the entire
settlement. Id.
Shalia Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause Death Are Charged or Convicted, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/police-killings-prosecutioncharges.html [https://perma.cc/6LH7-W7PM] (“Union protections that shield police officers
31

32

33

34

35

36

37
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many police departments already require. 38 Statutes defining deadly use of
force focus exclusively on the officer’s state of mind and neglect the officer’s
conduct during the situation that led to the use of deadly force. 39 While
Minnesota actually included some improvements to its deadly use-of-force
statute last summer, the law in Minnesota still focuses entirely on the
moment that deadly force was used rather than what officers could have
done to prevent the situation from arising at all. 40
This article responds to each of these problems with three specific
legislative proposals based on similar ideas from community activists,
academics, legislators, and other states. For example, in response to the
limited effectiveness of § 1983, Colorado recently enacted a state-based
equivalent. 41 Its new law explicitly denies accused officers the protection of
qualified immunity while providing the benefits afforded plaintiffs under the
federal act, including attorney’s fees. 42 In response to the near-universal
indemnification of officers, community activists have been pushing the idea
from timely investigation, legal standards that give them the benefit of the doubt, and a
tendency to take officers at their word have added up to few convictions and little prison time
for officers who kill.”).
For example, Minnesota’s state statutory standards for deadly use of force are less restrictive
than those of local law enforcement. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICY
MANUAL § 5-301, at III.B.3 (2020) (“Officers shall not use deadly force except in accordance
with MN Statute § 609.066, and [adding] even in those circumstances officers shall first
consider all reasonable alternatives including less lethal measures, before using deadly
force.”). St. Paul requires its officers to first try to de-escalate the conflict and limits authorized
use of force to situations involving an “imminent” threat. ST. PAUL POLICE DEP’T, POLICY
MANUAL § 246.01, at IV (de-escalation), § 246.00, at VII.B (2020).
See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation,
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 637 (2018)
(“Existing statutes on police use of deadly force tend to focus on the reasonableness of the
officer’s belief in the need to use force.”).
See MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 2(b) (effective March 1, 2021) (authorizing deadly use
of force only “if an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the benefit of hindsight, that such
force is necessary . . . to protect the peace officer or another from death or great bodily
harm”).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 (2020) (stating that a police officer who “under color
of law” deprives any person of rights protected under Article II of the Colorado State
Constitution “is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable or any other appropriate
relief”); see also Russell Berman, The State Where Protests Have Already Forced Major
Police
Reform,
THE
ATLANTIC
(July
17,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/07/police-reform-law-colorado/614269/
[https://perma.cc/9P8T-GGD2] (reporting how, after gunshots had been fired into the crowd
during a protest just outside the state capitol, State Rep. Leslie Herod told her fellow
Democrats, “I don’t want a card. I don’t want any niceties. I want a bill, and I need your
support to get a bill introduced that addresses these concerns.”).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 (2)(b) & (4) (2020). The Act also limits liability caps
and other immunities. See id. at (2)(a) (“Statutory immunities and statutory limitations on
liability, damages, or attorney feeds do not apply to claims brought pursuant to this section.”).
38

39

40
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of professional liability insurance for officers for years. Last summer, several
state representatives drafted actual legislation. 43 While that bill did not pass,
it is at least a template for future legislation. 44 Lastly, Professor Cynthia Lee
drafted a model use of force statute with provisions that address many gaps
that persist within Minnesota’s deadly use of force statute after the police
reform bill passed last summer, namely covering pre-seizure conduct and
whether officers attempted to de-escalate the situation before using deadly
force. 45
Minnesota can build on each of these three ideas to create
legislative reforms targeting current weaknesses in the law around police
accountability. Minnesota’s past provides important context for the urgency
of additional reform in this area. 46 Part II of this article provides background
on the racist and problematic history of policing in Minnesota and the many
reports and studies that have both condemned the State’s lack of action and
proposed specific steps that could have helped, but were never taken. 47
Part III of this article details the three specific legislative proposals
recommended to address the problems discussed above. First, Minnesota
should enact a state-based civil rights statute modeled on federal § 1983, but
with explicit restrictions on qualified immunity. 48 Second, Minnesota should
enact a complete change to the current model of officer indemnification and
require that officers carry their own professional liability insurance, just like
lawyers and doctors do, to leverage market-based accountability forces. 49
Third, Minnesota should amend its current statute on police use of deadly
force to include consideration of what an officer does or does not do that
contributes to the circumstances leading to the deadly use of force. 50
H.R. 87, 2020 Leg., 2d Spec. Sess., at 1–3 (Minn. 2020),
http://wdoc.house.leg.state.mn.us/leg/LS91/2_2020/HF0087.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3MR-46RB].
See generally Judy Greenwald, Group Presses for Police Insurance Reform; Minneapolis
Self-Insured,
BUS.
INS.:
RISK
MGMT.
(June
10,
2020),
43

44

https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200610/NEWS06/912335052/Grouppresses-for-police-insurance-reform-Minneapolis-self-insured#
[https://perma.cc/CC68XTU8] (providing background on the discussions about policies that would require police
officers to carry liability insurance).
See Lee, supra note 39, at 664–65 (detailing model statute provisions on police officers’
use of deadly force). Professor Lee hopes that such changes may encourage police “to act
with more care before using deadly force.” See id. at 638 (“Reforming the law in a way that
encourages the use of deadly force only when it is proportionate and necessary can provide
a useful counter to [officers’ natural] self-preservation instinct.”).
JOHN D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND EXECUTIONS IN MINNESOTA
229 (2003) (“[T]he violent legacy left behind by state-sanctioned and extrajudicial killings in
Minnesota must never be forgotten.”).
See infra Part II.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
45
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47
48
49
50
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MINNESOTA’S PAST AND PRESENT: RACISM AND POLICE
ABUSE FOLLOWED BY STUDIES AND INACTION

Minnesota History

Despite its progressive image, 51 Minnesota has a long history of
racial oppression and police violence. 52 Two examples illustrate this point:
the largest mass execution in American history and the northernmost
lynching on record both occurred in Minnesota. 53

1.

The Largest Mass Execution in the Country

As far back as its inception, Minnesota used its military power and
the criminal justice system to remove, exclude, and in many cases, murder
the populations of Indigenous communities that were already living in
Minnesota when Europeans first arrived. 54 Governor Alexander Ramsey
51

Minnesota was recently rated as the second most liberal state in the country. The Hill Staff,

How Red or Blue is Your State?, THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2014, 6:00 AM),

https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/house-races/221721-how-red-or-blue-is-your-state
[https://perma.cc/EMD8-55EA]. The Democratic candidate has won Minnesota in eleven
straight presidential elections making it the longest active Democratic streak in the country
for any state, whereas no Republican has won any statewide election in Minnesota since 2006
(including senator, governor, and even state auditor). Nathaniel Rakich, Why Minnesota
Could Be the Next Midwestern State to Go Red, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 31, 2020, 7:00
AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-minnesota-could-be-the-next-midwesternstate-to-go-red/ [https://perma.cc/VHZ2-JZ9V]; see also Briana Bierschbach, Why Is
Minnesota More Liberal Than Its Neighboring States?, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:00
AM),
https://www.startribune.com/why-is-minnesota-more-liberal-than-its-neighboringstates/569326221/ [https://perma.cc/GTQ5-HE24] (noting that “the merger between the
Democratic Party and the more left-wing Farmer-Labor Party created the Democratic-FarmerLabor Party (DFL) in 1944, giving a home to liberal voters and helping to solidify a progressive
streak in the state”).
See infra notes 67–87 and accompanying text (reporting on studies conducted over the past
five decades).
Another stain on Minnesota’s history is its role in slavery and slavery’s role in the early
financial enterprises of the new state. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. LEHMAN, SLAVERY’S
REACH: SOUTHERN SLAVEHOLDERS IN THE NORTH STAR STATE 6 (explaining how
“Minnesotans allowed illegal slaveholding in their communities and benefited from it. . . .
Southern dollars from slave plantations helped Minnesota’s businesses, communities, and
institutions to develop, and Minnesotans disregarded federal law in order to keep the money
flowing.”); see also John D. Bessler, What I Think About When I Think About the Death
Penalty, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 784 (2018) (writing about Minnesota, “Examples of
miscarriages of justice are, in reality, incredibly easy to find—and they can often be found
close to home.”).
Waziyatawin, Ph.D., Colonial Calibrations: The Expendability of Minnesota’s Original
People, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 450, 455 (2013) (“The United States unilaterally
abrogated our treaties, stole our Minnesota homeland, imprisoned our people in
concentration camps, force-marched our women and children, mass-lynched our warriors,
mass-incarcerated our able-bodied men, ethnically-cleansed us from Minnesota, and then
52

53

54
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made clear his intentions in an appearance before the Minnesota State
Legislature in the fall of 1862, stating that the Dakota peoples “must be
exterminated or driven forever beyond the borders of the State.” 55 Later that
year, on December 26, at the conclusion of the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862,
and at the direction of state leaders, thirty-eight Dakota men were hanged
simultaneously from a massive scaffold that had been constructed expressly
for the mass execution. 56 Minnesota had initially wanted to hang more than
300 men, but President Lincoln decided to reduce the number. 57 Despite
the “highly suspect” circumstances under which most of those sentenced to
death had been convicted, President Lincoln decided to carry out the mass
execution of the thirty-eight men. 58

instituted further policies of genocide, including a bounty system on Dakota scalps.”); see
also Colette Routel, Minnesota Bounties on Dakota Men During the U.S.-Dakota War of
1862, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (chronicling the state-ordered bounty system
“as part of a much broader extermination program that was at the heart of federal Indian
policy during this time period”).
Waziyatawin, supra note 54, at 459.
Angelique EagleWoman (Wambdi A. Was’teWinyan), Wintertime for the Sisseton55
56

Wahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations by the
United States and the Need for a Reconciliation Involving International Indigenous Human
Rights Norms, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 486, 517 (2013). For a detailed recounting of the

events leading up to the war and the atrocities committed against the Dakota peoples during
and after the war, see id. at 506–19.
Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43
STAN. L. REV. 13, 32 (1990). Lincoln faced strong resistance from many Minnesotans who
were outraged that he was reducing the number to be hanged. See, e.g., id. at 29–30
(describing newspaper headlines and an open letter to the President from “the citizens of St.
Paul” predicting vengeance by the settlers).
Lenor A. Scheffler, Reflections of a Contemporary Minnesota Dakota Lawyer: Dakota
Identity and Its Impacts in 1862 and 2012, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 582, 602 (2013); see
also Chomsky, supra note 57, at 14 (detailing the unusual features of the executions,
including the review of the sentences “not by an appellate court, but by the President of
the United States”). In all the wars that took place between European settlers and members
of the Indigenous nations, “in no others did the United States apply criminal sanctions to
punish those defeated in war.” Id. Professor EagleWoman has criticized President Lincoln
for not following the “general military practice at the time.” Vincent Schilling, The Traumatic
True History and Name List of the Dakota 38, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (December 27,
2017), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/the-traumatic-true-history-and-name-list-ofthe-dakota-38-3awsx1BAdU2v_KWM81RomQ [https://perma.cc/U895-JKGE]. “They
should have been released. He made a political decision . . . based on the racial hatred . . .
Lincoln was a lawyer [and] knew that this was improper.” Id.; see also Paul Finkelman, U.S.57

58

Dakota War of 1862: “I Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes.” Lincoln the Lawyer,
Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 405, 412

(2013) (detailing Lincoln’s many “strong political reasons for supporting the executions” and
explaining how “Lincoln could hardly afford to risk alienating voters in Minnesota”).
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The Northernmost Lynching on Record

Minnesota was also the site of the northernmost lynching recorded
in the country. 59 On June 15, 1920, nearly one hundred years to the day
before George Floyd was killed, three African American men, Elias
Clayton, Elmer Jackson, and Isaac McGhie, were lynched by a mob of
thousands of White people in Duluth. 60 The police ignored clear warnings
that afternoon of a planned lynching. 61 After being wrenched out of their jail
cells by force, beaten, and subjected to a mock trial, the three men were
hung from lampposts one block away while an estimated 10,000 White
people watched. 62 Many of the White people participated in the lynching
Oswald G. Villard et al., Editorial Paragraphs, 110 THE NATION 839, 841 (June 26, 1920),
https://www.unz.com/print/Nation-1920jun26-00839/
[https://perma.cc/N6QR-JEBJ]
(describing the lynching as presenting “no unusual circumstances” except for “establishing a
new farthest north of the tide of race hatred”) (on file with author). Racial violence and
murder was at a high point in the North during this time. See, e.g., Emma Coleman Jordan, A
History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557, 611 (2003) (“In
the summer of 1919, there were twenty-three race riots, primarily in northern cities.”).
Tina Burnside, On June 15, 1920, A Duluth Mob Lynched Three Black Men, MINNPOST
(June 29, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2019/07/on-june-15-1920-a-duluthmob-lynched-three-black-men/ [https://perma.cc/NE7H-MT54]. The details of how the
three men died are particularly chilling. See id. (“When McGhie’s rope broke, they hung
him a second time. A man sitting on a lamppost [being used for the lynching] repeatedly
kicked Clayton in the face as he suffocated [from the hanging].”).
See NAACP, DULUTH, MN BRANCH, supra note 20; see also Juergens, supra note 20, at
413 (citing Plan to Hang Negroes Bared to Police Tuesday Afternoon, DULUTH NEWS TRIB.
June 18, 1920, at 1). Despite being specifically warned that a mob “was planning to dynamite
the jail and kill the suspects,” the police “did little to head off the evening’s attack.” Id.; see
also Burnside, supra note 60 (“Duluth Commissioner of Public Safety William F. Murnian
failed to instruct his officers to stop the rioters forcefully, allowing them to enter the jail.”).
“In his 1933 book, ‘The Tragedy of Lynching,’ the sociologist Arthur F. Raper estimated
that, based on his study of 100 lynchings, white police officers participated in at least half of
all lynchings and that in 90 percent of others law-enforcement officers ‘either condone or
wink at the mob action.’” Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Is Owned, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June
30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/24/magazine/reparationsslavery.html [https://perma.cc/RA34-J4C6].
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW
& INEQ. 263, 266 (2003). As in so many lynchings, the Black victims had been falsely accused
by a White woman of sexual assault. Tom Nelson, Our Duluth Lynchings, 77 BENCH & BAR
MINN. 4, 4 (2020). Ida B. Wells long ago pointed out that lynching linked the violent murder
of Black men with the reinforcement of the sexual taboo against relations between Black
men and White women. See Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Lynch Law in America, 23 THE ARENA
15,
18
(Jan.
1900),
https://archive.org/details/ArenaMagazineVolume23a/page/n29/mode/2up?q=lynch+law [https://perma.cc/FLZ3-NEFF].
[M]any men have been put to death whose innocence was afterward
established; and to-day, under this reign of the “unwritten law,” no
colored man, no matter what his reputation, is safe from lynching if a
white woman, no matter what her standing or motive, cares to charge
him with insult or assault.
59

60

61

62
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and posed with the dead bodies, joking about sending the picture to the
South as a message. 63 Historian Bill Green described the scene as “White
men mugging for the camera like fishermen displaying their prize catches.” 64

B.

Decades of Studies and Reports with the Same Conclusions (and the
Same Inaction)

Racism and police abuse are not merely relics of Minnesota’s past.
In what he termed the Minnesota Paradox, Dr. Sam Myers documented
how, although Minnesota is considered “a great place to live,” 65 the state has
the largest disparities between White residents and Black residents in nearly
every major facet of life:
Measured by racial gaps in unemployment rates, wage and
salary incomes, incarceration rates, arrest rates, home
ownership rates, mortgage lending rates, test scores,
reported child maltreatment rates, school disciplinary and
suspension rates, and even drowning rates, African
Americans are worse off in Minnesota than they are in
virtually every other state in the nation. 66
Id.

BESSLER, supra note 46, at 196–97; see also Nelson, supra note 62, at 4 (explaining how
postcards from the lynching “flew off the shelves of Duluth merchants at fifty cents each”).
William D. Green, Thoughts About Commemorating the Duluth Lynchings, 77 BENCH &
BAR MINN. 12, 13 (May/June 2020).
Heather Brown, The ‘Minnesota Paradox’: Why the State Has One of the Largest Racial
Disparities, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2020), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/06/23/theminnesota-paradox-why-the-land-of-10000-lakes-has-one-of-the-largest-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/T2KJ-4HBQ] (“Survey after survey have stated that Minnesota is a great
place to live.”); see also David Leonhardt, ‘The Minnesota Paradox’, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/briefing/minneapolis-coronavirus-tara-readeryour-monday-briefing.html [https://perma.cc/73X4-V64K] (“Minnesota’s Twin Cities metro
area has one of the country’s highest standards of living by many measures: high incomes,
long life expectancy, a large number of corporate headquarters and a rich cultural scene.”).
Dr. Samuel Myers, The Minnesota Paradox, U. MINN.: HUBERT H. HUMPHREY SCH. OF
PUB. AFFS. (June 5, 2020), https://www.hhh.umn.edu/roy-wilkins-center-human-relationsand-social-justice/minnesota-paradox, [https://perma.cc/KL4P-56S4]; see also Taylor Gee,
Something Is Rotten in the State of Minnesota, POLITICO MAG. (June 16, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/minnesota-race-inequality-philandocastile-214053 [https://perma.cc/T6EJ-A8XE] (confirming Dr. Myers’ assessment: “In
metrics across the board—household income, unemployment rates, poverty rates and
education attainment—the gap between white people and people of color is significantly larger
in Minnesota than it is most everywhere else.”); Jeff Wagner, Minnesota Ranked 2nd-Worst
in U.S. For Racial Equality, CBS MINN. (August 22, 2017, 10:15 PM),
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2017/08/22/minnesota-racial-inequality/
[https://perma.cc/3EJB-UKEM] (“[B]lack people in Minnesota are ten times more likely to
end up in jail or prison than [W]hite people.”); Randy Furst & MaryJo Webster, How Did
Minnesota Become One of the Most Racially Inequitable States?, STAR TRIB. (September
6, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://www.startribune.com/how-did-minnesota-become-one-of-the63

64

65

66
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The killing of George Floyd was not an anomaly. Decades of
studies and reports have documented the same thing: police abuse and
racism toward racially marginalized communities. In 1993, the Minnesota
Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System found that
in Hennepin County, People of Color and Whites were arrested and
charged at vastly disproportionate rates. 67 As the task force observed, “One
glaring signpost of the specter of racism in the disposition of criminal cases
is the fact that although people of color comprise 6% of the state’s
population, they comprise 45% of the prison population.” 68 The task force
also found that, “although the justice system is no longer made to enforce
the ultimate social control of slavery or the complex codes of legal
segregation that took its place, the justice system still finds itself being used
as a powerful tool of the pervasive prejudice and the subtle, often elaborately
camouflaged discrimination that still deeply scars our national life.” 69 Not
surprisingly, the task force concluded that “Nowhere in the system is this
‘control’ dynamic more in evidence than in the interaction of communities
of color with the police.” 70
In 2003, the Council on Crime and Justice and Institute on Race
and Poverty conducted a study on traffic stop arrest rates. They jointly
reported to the legislature that police stopped and searched Black, Latinx,
and Native American drivers at greater rates than White drivers. 71
Importantly, the researchers also determined that officers had “found
contraband as a result of searches of [Black, Latinx, and Native American
drivers] at lower rates than in searches of White drivers.” 72 Racial profiling
in arrests was found statewide. 73 The disparities “existed in nearly every

most-racially-inequitable-states/547537761/ [https://perma.cc/DD6L-JG97] (“By almost any
measurement, Minnesota is plagued by racial disparities. In unemployment statistics. In the
percentage of people in poverty. In homeownership. And in other areas as well.”).
MINN. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUD. SYS., FINAL REPORT 14 (1993),
https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/CEJ/1993-MinnesotaSupreme-Court-Task-Force-on-Racial-Bias-in-the-Judicial-System-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M62-9QPV].
Id. at S-3.
Id. at 5.
Id. The task force detailed “a pattern of racial bias . . . throughout the justice system.” Id.
at 7. Reporting data from the early 1990s, the task force found that “[a]lmost 15 years after
the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act, Native American children are still being
removed from their homes at approximately 10 times the rate that [W]hite children are
removed.” Id.
COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST. & INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINNESOTA RACIAL
PROFILING STUDY: ALL JURISDICTIONS REPORT, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2 (2003),
https://www.leg.mn.gov/docs/2004/mandated/040199.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKB4-VWB6].
67

68
69
70

71

72
73

Id.
Id.
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participating jurisdiction” across the state. 74 The researchers concluded that
“[t]hese patterns suggest a strong likelihood that racial/ethnic bias plays a
role in traffic stop policies and practices in Minnesota.” 75
In 2009, there were two major investigations of the Metro Gang
Strike Force, a multi-jurisdictional police task force commissioned to fight
drug trade and violent crime throughout Minnesota. 76 An investigation
revealed that since its inception in 1997, officers were improperly seizing
money and property and often brutalizing innocent victims, many of whom
were People of Color. 77 As one investigation found, “It is difficult to classify,
in terms of severity, the areas of misconduct revealed by this investigation.” 78
Some allegations were found “to be shocking.” 79 Racial profiling by the
Strike Force included “shakedowns” that targeted undocumented
immigrants. 80
Between 2006 and 2012, the City of Minneapolis paid out $14
million for alleged police misconduct, though very few of these cases
resulted in disciplinary action for officers. 81 In addition to instances of police
misconduct and use of force, arrest data from the Minneapolis Police
Department suggests a disparate impact in the enforcement of low-level
offenses against People of Color. Of the nearly 100,000 arrests for low-level
offenses made by Minneapolis police officers between 2012 and 2014,

74
75

Id. at 3.
Id.

The initial investigation was conducted by the Office of the Legislative Auditor. METRO
GANG
STRIKE
FORCE REV. PANEL,
REPORT 1–2
(Aug.
20,
2009),
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/co/about/Documents/final_report_mgsf_review_panel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ZVP-G67T] [hereinafter METRO GANG STRIKE FORCE REPORT]. On the
night after the Legislative Auditor’s report was issued, “a number of Strike Force officers
were observed shredding documents at the Strike Force offices.” Id. at 2.
See id. at 22–23. The report noted that “these encounters almost always involved a [P]erson
of [C]olor.” Id. at 22; see also Randy Furst, Payouts Reveal Brutal, Rogue Metro Gang Strike
Force, STAR TRIB. (Aug 5, 2012, 5:15 PM), https://www.startribune.com/payouts-revealbrutal-rogue-metro-gang-strike-force/165028086/ [https://perma.cc/7U33-WHNS] (“The
stories and payouts to 96 victims of the now-defunct Strike Force . . . provide the most
detailed picture yet of an out-of-control police squad.”).
METRO GANG STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 76, at 14.
76

77

78
79

Id.

Virgil Wiebe, Immigration Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in
Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 581, 626 (2017) (describing how the Strike Force “ran off
the rails in the mid-2000s”); see also METRO GANG STRIKE FORCE REPORT, supra note 76,
80

at 11 (“The Strike Force’s mission does not support the creation of roving ‘saturation’ details
that stop people for traffic violations or seize the funds of an undocumented alien who has
committed no other offense. Yet this is what we found, many times over.”).
Alejandra Matos & Randy Furst, Minneapolis Cops Rarely Disciplined in Big-Payout Cases,
STAR TRIB. (June 3, 2013, 2:06 PM), https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-cops-rarelydisciplined-in-big-payout-cases/209811991/ [https://perma.cc/D2Z6-BQ4C].
81
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African Americans accounted for 59%, despite representing only 19% of the
city’s population. 82
A recent report by the Minnesota Advisory Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found selective enforcement of nonviolent
offenses contributes to higher rates of incarceration for People of Color. 83
Statewide, African Americans represent 6% of the population, yet as of
January 2016, they made up 35% of the state’s prison population. 84 For
Native Americans, “the disparity is even starker.” 85 Despite only
representing 1% of the population, Native Americans account for 10% of
the state’s prison population. 86
Most recently, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison and
Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington convened a
working group on police-involved killings in the spring of 2020 and
produced a wide range of recommendations. The Working Group
summarized the results of decades of inaction:
There have been many firm opinions over the years about
why police-involved deadly force encounters persist, and
those opinions have grown more intense and more
polarized as people’s and communities’ frustration, grief,
and anger has grown. This has also made practical
solutions for reducing them that can be effectively
implemented and widely adopted harder and harder to
agree on. In the meantime, people continue losing their
lives, survivors’ lives continue being changed forever,
communities continue being torn apart, and trust between
community and law enforcement continues to fray. 87
Picking up the Pieces: A Minneapolis Case Study, ACLU (2015),
https://www.aclu.org/issues/racial-justice/race-and-criminal-justice/picking-pieces
[https://perma.cc/QDU2-CS7J]. According to the research, African Americans were 8.7
times more likely and Native Americans were 8.6 times more likely to be arrested for a lowlevel offense than White people. Id. Racial profiling seems even more obvious when looking
at disparities between nighttime and daytime stops. As the ACLU study found, at 3:00 AM,
Black drivers in Minneapolis are two times more likely than White drivers to be pulled over
and arrested for an active driving violation, but at 2:00 PM, when officers presumably can
better identify the driver’s race, Black drivers are nine times more likely to be stopped. Id.
MINN. ADVISORY COMM. TO U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., CIVIL RIGHTS AND POLICING
PRACTICES IN MINNESOTA 9 (2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/03-22-MN-CivilRights.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6XK-GLRN].
82

83

84
85
86

Id.
Id.
Id.

STATE OF MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY WORKING GROUP, POLICE-INVOLVED DEADLY
FORCE ENCOUNTERS 1 (Feb. 2020), https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/co/workinggroup/Documents/police-involved-deadly-force-encounters-recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49CM-5FPF] [hereinafter STATE OF MINN. WORKING GROUP].
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Past Signs of Progress

While Minnesota has a history of racial violence, it has a track
record of responding as well. In the wake of the lynchings in Duluth,
Governor J.A.A. Burnquist, who was also president of the St. Paul NAACP
at the time, immediately called in the National Guard later that night to
disperse the mob. 88 Troops were stationed in Black neighborhoods to
protect Black citizens. 89 The St. Paul NAACP initiated and funded an
outside investigation. 90 And in time, Duluth became the first city in America
to create a public memorial to lynching victims. 91
The Minnesota Legislature also responded to the lynchings.
Pushed hard by lobbying from the NAACP and, in particular, activist Nellie
Francis, 92 the Minnesota Legislature passed arguably the strongest antilynching legislation at the time, 93 and it became one of the first states to ban
lynching altogether. 94 Drafted by Francis, the legislation sailed through both
the House and the Senate with a nearly unanimous vote and was signed into
law in April 1921, less than one year after the lynchings. 95 With a sharp eye
towards the complicity of the police in the Duluth lynchings, the new law
88
89
90
91

BESSLER, supra note 46, at 197.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 197.
See Nelson, supra note 62, at 4 (“Duluth was the very first community in our nation to

build a monument to honor its lynching victims.”).
BESSLER, supra note 46, at 216. W.E.B. DuBois even paid visits to both Duluth and St.
Paul to support the effort. Id. at 217. The National NAACP sent Francis and local NAACP
leaders various supporting materials, including a copy of the anti-lynching legislation from
Kentucky. Id. at 217. The NAACP was founded in 1909 largely to confront the issue of
lynching and racist mob violence against Black communities. See LANGSTON HUGHES,
FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE NAACP 20–23 (1962) (describing founding of
NAACP in response to a 1908 Springfield, Illinois riot in which African Americans were
lynched, injured, and driven from the city, and their homes and businesses destroyed); see
also James W. Fox Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal
Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113, 163 (2006) (noting how, along with
Ida B. Wells, the NAACP “devoted significant efforts to persuade both state and federal
White legislators to pass anti-lynching bills”).
See Nolan, supra note 21, at 69–70 (providing a historical review of state anti-lynching
legislation).
Juergens, supra note 20, at 417; see also Act approved Apr. 20, 1921, ch. 401, 1921 Minn.
Laws 612 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 373.28 (1974)) (“An act to prevent lynching; to fix
indemnity for the dependents of any person lynched, and to provide for the removal from
office of the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs having charge of any person lynched.”). The antilynching statute, unfortunately, was quietly repealed in 1984. See MINN. STAT. § 373.28
(1974), repealed by Act approved May 2, 1984, ch. 629, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 1713, 1763.
BESSLER, supra note 46, at 217; see also Mrs. W.T. Francis Author of Anti-Lynching Bill,
NW .
BULL.,
at
1,
4,
(May
12,
1923),
https://www.mnhs.org/duluthlynchings/documents/Mrs_WT_Francis_Author_of_AntiLyn
ching_Bill-831.001.php [https://perma.cc/N4WM-WD3N] (identifying Francis with the
“high distinct honor” of being the “Mother” of the anti-lynching legislation).
92
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imposed liability on counties for lynching victims murdered in their county
and made failure to use all reasonable means to prevent a lynching a fireable
offense for law enforcement officers. 96 The state also put pressure on the
federal government. Over the next sixteen years, the Minnesota Legislature
would twice approve joint resolutions calling on the U.S. Congress to enact
a federal anti-lynching bill. 97
III.

A

THREE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MINNESOTA POLICE

Proposal No. 1: Enact a State-based Equivalent to § 1983

Section 1983 is considered “the most important legal vehicle for
holding police and other government officials accountable for
misconduct.” 98 The law was written specifically “to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people . . . to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law.” 99 The Supreme Court once
believed that the purpose of § 1983 was to establish “the role of the Federal
Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power.” 100 As
the Court explained, § 1983 “was intended not only to provide

Act approved Apr. 20, 1921 §§1–4. For example, the civil cap on damages against a county
was $7,500, the same amount sought by one of the lynching victim’s fathers. BESSLER, supra
note 46, at 220.
See S. Con. Res. 14, 1935 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1935) (“BE IT RESOLVED, by the
Senate of the State of Minnesota, the House of Representatives concurring therein, that the
Congress of the United States be and is hereby memorialized to enact a Federal AntiLynching law at the present session.”); H.R. Con. Res. 16, 1937 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
1937) (same).
See Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 2; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239
(1972) (“Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely
federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.”). The Supreme Court also recognized
the important role of § 1983 in Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1980) (“This
statute, enacted to aid in the preservation of human liberty and human rights reflects a
congressional judgment that a damages remedy against the offending party is a vital
component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.”) (internal
citations omitted).
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
Id. at 239. The federal legislation was necessary because “state courts were being used to
harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop
deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally
protected rights.” Id. at 240. Section 1983 was crafted to “alter[] the relationship between the
States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was
concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state
officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that
these failings extended to the state courts.” Id. at 242.
96

97
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compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent
against future constitutional deprivations, as well.” 101
However, the Court has incrementally disabled § 1983. 102 As a
result, § 1983 has “failed to live up to its promise of eradicating widespread
and pernicious practices of rank and file officers.” 103 Instead of preserving §
1983’s original purpose as a “guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power,” the Court has reversed course and worries instead about the
“potential costs that § 1983 imposes on government.” 104 While protecting
government officials, the Court “has consistently narrowed the statute and
made it more difficult for plaintiffs to vindicate violations of their rights.” 105

1.

The Unfulfilled Promise of § 1983

a.

The Complicated History of § 1983

Section 1983 was originally enacted as Section 1 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, 106 in response to some of the most violent racial hostility
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
See Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State Constitutions
Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence, 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 877, 889–90 (2011) (explaining how the Court’s more recent interpretation
of § 1983 “has erected three often insurmountable obstacles to recovering damages caused
by the violation of federal constitutional rights (qualified immunity, no vicarious liability, and
absolute immunity for state government entities)”); Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 4 (2018)
(“[T]he Court has been hostile to the statute, continuously narrowing it and imposing
restrictions on civil rights plaintiffs.”); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move
from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1751 (1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
increasingly undermined and demeaned § 1983 with a tort rhetoric strategy designed to
control the statute’s text and interpretation.”); see also infra notes 164–85 and accompanying
text (detailing the impact of qualified immunity on § 1983 interpretation).
Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 20 (2000).
Compare Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961)), with Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 95 (1989). See also Thompson v. Clark,
No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 3128975, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) (describing the
Court’s policy justifications for limiting § 1983’s reach and concluding that “consistently
lurking in the background is the threat of financial cost to government officials”).
Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 12.
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In relevant
part, the Ku Klux Klan Act, which is substantively similar to the current language of § 1983,
provided as follows:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
101
102
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104

105
106

2020]

IMPROVING POLICE OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY

243

in the country’s history. 107 Congress rushed through passage of the Act “in a
highly inflamed atmosphere.” 108 With a certain degree of understatement,
the Supreme Court explained in 1985 that the “specific historical catalyst
for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the campaign of violence and deception
in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent
citizens their civil and political rights.” 109 But the true scale of the dire
circumstances surrounding passage of the Act provides important context
to its purpose, as the Court acknowledged just twelve years earlier: “Any
analysis of the purposes and scope of § 1983 must take cognizance of the
events and passions of the time at which it was enacted.” 110
As soon as the Civil War ended, White Southerners organized the
Ku Klux Klan, and “a wave of murders and assaults was launched against
both African Americans and Union sympathizers.” 111 The Ku Klux Klan
and other various white supremacist groups intended to restore the racial
hierarchy of the pre-war South by all means available, including murder,
threats, intimidation, and the essential takeover of the local legal system,
party injured in, any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress[.]
Id. The provision was patterned after a criminal provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
but that act was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State
Courts, and § 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 972 (1987).
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877,
at 425–26 (1988). On the House floor, Congressman Joseph Hayne Rainey, the first African
American to serve in the House of the Representatives, stated that the “enormity of the
crimes constantly perpetrated there finds no parallel in the history of this Republic in her
very darkest days.” CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 393–95 (1871).
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 (1951). The Act was “rushed through a deeply
troubled Republican Congress.” Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution:
A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 530 (1985); see also Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (“Section 1, now codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without
amendment.”).
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Two years before he wrote those words,
Justice Stevens was a little more descriptive about the history that led to the Act’s passage:
The Ku Klux Act . . . was enacted on April 20, 1871, less than a month
after President Grant sent a dramatic message to Congress describing
the breakdown of law and order in the Southern states. During the
debates, supporters of the bill repeatedly described the reign of terror
imposed by the Klan upon Black citizens and their White sympathizers
in the Southern states. Hours of oratory were devoted to the details of
Klan outrages—arson, robbery, whippings, shootings, murders, and
other forms of violence and intimidation—often committed in disguise
and under cover of night. These acts of lawlessness went unpunished,
legislators asserted, because Klan members and sympathizers controlled
or influenced the administration of state criminal justice.
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983) (citation omitted).
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973).
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including the state courts and local police. 112 As a result, “Congress faced,
just years after the close of an actual civil war, the threat of increasing
violence by those who were defeated on the battlefield and who, some
feared, sought to resurrect that system of political, economic, and social
organization that sparked the war.” 113 Similarly disturbing, local authorities
either “did nothing to protect the freedmen or actively participated in the
assaults.” 114
Congress responded by making certain acts punishable under
federal law because of the inability (and unwillingness) of the state courts at
that time to “enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of
others.” 115 As the Court famously explained
It is abundantly clear that one reason [§ 1983] was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims
of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and
See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 199 (1980)
(“The violence mounted through the late 1860s and early 1870s as the Ku Klux Klan
organized raids, lynchings, beatings, burnings.”); W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK
RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, 670 (1935) (detailing the strategic use of
atrocities during this period by “secret organizations and the rise of a new doctrine of race
hatred”); FONER, supra note 107, at 425 (“In effect, the Klan was a military force serving . . .
all those who desired the restoration of white supremacy.”).
Michael F. Roessler, Mistaking Doubts and Qualms for Constitutional Law: Against the
Rejection of Legislative History as A Tool of Legal Interpretation, 39 SW. L. REV. 103, 121
(2009). “The South had lost the war, but it appeared to some in Congress that, even in defeat,
elements of the rebellion would attempt to impose by violence in a time of ostensible peace
that which could not be won on the battlefields during a time of actual war.” Id. As Justice
Brennan put it, “It was fighting to save the Union.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, racially marginalized communities
and individuals were still subject to racist murder and other violence well into the twentieth
century (and to a lesser degree even today). See generally MANNING MARABLE, RACE,
REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION OF BLACK AMERICA, 1945–
1990, at 174–78 (1991) (detailing acts of violence by the Ku Klux Klan in the twentieth
century); see also TIMOTHY TYSON, THE BLOOD OF EMMETT TILL 214 (2017) (“A white
supremacist gunman slaughtering nine Black churchgoers in a prayer meeting in Charleston,
South Carolina, in 2014, however, reminds us that the ideology of white supremacy remains
with us in its most brutal and overt forms.”).
See Gilles, supra note 103, at 55–56 (“Sheriffs refused to investigate or arrest [White
people] suspected of crimes against [African Americans], district attorneys refused to
prosecute, and courts refused to entertain civil cases brought by the freedmen against their
[W]hite persecutors.”).
Carter, 409 U.S. at 426; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 252 (1871)
(statement of Sen. Oliver H.P.T. Morton of Ind.) (“But it is said that these crimes
[established by the Ku Klux Klan Act] should be punished by the States; that they are already
offenses against the laws of the States, and the matter should be left to the States. The answer
to that is, that the States do not punish them; the States do not protect the rights of the people;
the State courts are powerless to redress these wrongs.”).
112
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immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies. 116
The Court cited the extensive legislative history of the Act, including the
forceful remarks of Representative David Lowe who explained, “While
murder is stalking in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and
banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the
local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the
proper corrective.” 117
Given the depth of the problem, it was clear from the onset that the
application of § 1983 would have to be broad. 118 The chief author of the Act,
Representative Samuel Shellabarger, advised that § 1983 was to be “liberally
and beneficently construed” to afford a remedy to victims, as is characteristic
of remedial statutes designed to protect individual liberty. 119 Even the bill’s
opponents understood the broad remedial power that Congress intended. 120
While opposing the bill, Senator Allen Thurman observed, “[T]here is no
limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, and they are as
comprehensive as can be used.” 121
Despite its noble beginnings, however, § 1983 was dormant for
nearly a century. 122 Indeed, § 1983 was “almost dead on arrival” given the

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 374 (1871) (statement of Rep. David Lowe).
Rep. Lowe reported, “Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies,
wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice.” Id.; see also
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 182 (1990) (“[I]n 1871, Congress was concerned with
Ku Klux Klan activities that were going unpunished in the Southern States and designed §
1983’s remedy to combat this evil, recognizing the need for original federal-court jurisdiction
as a means to provide at least indirect federal control over the unconstitutional acts of state
officials.”)
See, e.g., Gildin, supra note 102, at 888 (“The unqualified language and legislative history
of Section 1983 suggest that the statute would furnish a generous remedy to victims of
governmental misconduct.”); Gomez v. Toledo 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“As remedial
legislation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.”).
CONG. GLOBE APP., 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Samuel
Shellabarger) (“Th[e] [A]ct is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and
human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally
and beneficently construed. It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were
this not the rule of interpretation.”).
See Gildin, supra note 102, at 888 (“Supporters and opponents alike acknowledged the
breadth of the remedy that Section 1983 imparted to citizens whose federal constitutional
rights were invaded.”).
CONG. GLOBE APP., 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 216–17 (1871) (statement of Sen. Allen
Thurman). The Court felt that Thurman “gave the most exhaustive critique” of the Act
during legislative debates. Monell, 436 U.S. at 682.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2, at 374 (1989).
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Supreme Court’s treatment of civil rights after Reconstruction. 123 The
Court’s view of civil rights in the decades following its passage “immobilized
section 1983.” 124 Its ineffectiveness likely kept it good law, however, since
“[m]ost of the effective civil rights laws were repealed in 1894.” 125 As
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun concluded, in this “Dark Age of
Civil Rights, . . . the Nation’s commitment to civil rights lay in remnants.” 126
A study in 1951 found only twenty-one reported § 1983 cases in the fifty
years after its enactment. 127

b.

The Renewal of § 1983 – Monroe v. Pape

The Court brought § 1983 back to life in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape. 128
In Monroe, an African American family (including young children) alleged
that thirteen Chicago police officers broke into their home early one
morning, “routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living
room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress
covers.” 129 The father, James Monroe, was then taken to the police station
and detained on “open charges” for ten hours, interrogated in connection
with a murder, denied a hearing before a magistrate, barred from calling his
family or an attorney, and subsequently released with no charges against
See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the
Scope of § 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1498–99 (1989) (noting that § 1983 “served as the
123

litigational vehicle for only a smattering of constitutional cases in its first fifty years”).
See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 506 (1993) (“Shortly after the 1871 statute
became law, and for the next ninety years, the Court’s opinions immobilized [§] 1983,
rendering it ineffective against both an individual officer’s constitutional abuses and a
municipality’s role as a ‘moving force’ in causing those constitutional violations.”).
See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 549 n.153 (1982) (“Ironically, had § 1983 developed in the 1870s,
it is unlikely that it would have survived. Most of the effective civil rights laws were repealed
in 1894.”).
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1985). As Justice
Harry Blackmun reported, “from the 1890’s to the 1940’s, the Civil Rights Acts lay virtually
dormant.” Id. at 12. And “between 1939 and 1961, the significant § 1983 cases, like those
prior to 1939, were few.” Id. at 19. Part of the reason for so few suits was that there were also
few recognized federal rights. Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System
of Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 188
(2012) (“With so few rights to assert in a § 1983 lawsuit, there were few lawsuits.”).
Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26
IND. L.J. 361, 363–66 (1951).
365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961); see also Barbara Kritchevsky, “Or Causes to Be Subjected”:
The Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187,
1188 (1988) (“The Supreme Court liberated [§] 1983 from almost a century of obscurity
when it decided Monroe v. Pape.”).
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
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him. 130 Using § 1983, the family sued the officers, the Chicago Police
Department, and the City of Chicago for damages. 131 The lower court
dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the dismissal, ruling that police officer misconduct did not make a
“sufficient showing of a violation” of § 1983 under existing precedent. 132
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit decision, holding
that a § 1983 action could be brought against persons who violated federally
protected rights even though their acts were not authorized by state law. 133
After a lengthy review of the legislative history, the Court established three
core principles of § 1983 jurisprudence. First, the Court clarified that police
officers could still be held liable under § 1983 if their conduct was not
authorized (or even prohibited) by the state, expanding the definition of
“under color of state law.” 134 Second, the Court held that § 1983 “was
supplementary to the state remedy” so that plaintiffs did not have to first
demonstrate whether state law remedies were available. 135 As a result,
Monroe “not only contributed to the expanded role of federal law in
protecting individual rights but also guaranteed direct access to a federal
forum in § 1983 actions” regardless of whether there were any state law
remedies available. 136 Third, § 1983 requires no particular state of mind
requirement as a condition of liability. 137 Accordingly, “Monroe led to an

130
131
132

Id.

Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 365 (7th Cir. 1959), rev’d, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Id. at 366. As the Seventh Circuit explained, “We do not condone the alleged misconduct

of defendants, if true, but that is not the question before us. Under the . . . decisions of this
circuit . . . the dismissal before us necessarily follows. Plaintiffs are not without their remedy
in the state court.” Id.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184–85.
Id. at 171. As the Court explained, “Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent
it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.” Id. at
171–72; see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”). As the Court in
Monroe made clear, “We conclude that the meaning given ‘under color of’ law in the Classic
case . . . was the correct one; and we adhere to it.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183 (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked”). As the Court made clear, §
1983 “was passed . . . to afford a federal right in federal courts.” Id. at 180.
Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38
U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 389 (1984).
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (ruling that the law “should be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions”).
133
134

135

136
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explosion of Section 1983 claims in federal courts and to a corresponding
increase in attempts by the Court to limit its effects.” 138

c.

Congress Strengthens § 1983 – Attorney’s Fees

Congress would soon enhance § 1983 with the addition of
attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs in 1976. 139 Congress added attorney’s
fees in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 140 The Court ruled in Alyeska that
without statutory guidance or other exceptions that were not applicable in
this case, attorney’s fees were not available. 141 In doing so, the Court
reaffirmed the “American rule” that “each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall
bear its own attorney’s fees unless there is express statutory authorization to
the contrary.” 142 Although Alyeska was not a § 1983 case, lower courts
interpreted the decision to apply to § 1983 claims. 143
Edward R. Stabell, III, Zinermon v. Burch: Putting Brackets Around the Parratt Doctrine,
42 MERCER L. REV. 1655, 1656 (1991). Justice Scalia also noticed the impact of Monroe on
the volume of cases. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Monroe changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in the first 50 years
of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each year
. . . .”).
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)) (providing
that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of the costs”); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980) (“The legislative
history is entirely consistent with the plain language. As was true with § 1983, a major purpose
of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of
constitutional and civil rights.”).
421 U.S. 240 (1975). For an interesting historical perspective detailing the origins of the
bill, including the role NAACP lobbyist Clarence Mitchell had in the initiation of the
legislation, see Armand Derfner, Background and Origin of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee
Awards Act of 1976, 37 URB. LAW. 653, 653 (2005).
See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (“[W]e are convinced that it would be inappropriate for the
Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in the manner
and to the extent urged by respondents and approved by the Court of Appeals.”).
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); see also Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (“In the
United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’
fee from the loser.”).
Alyeska was brought under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, but the Court’s denial
of attorney’s fees absent statutory authorization was used by courts in denying attorney’s fees
in § 1983 actions. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Gigi A. Woodruff, Federal District Court
138

139

140

141

142

143

Proceedings to Recover Attorney’s Fees for Prevailing Parties on Section 1983 Claims in
State Administrative Agencies, 18 GA. L. REV. 83, 86–88 (1983) (citing Hostrop v. Bd. of

Junior Coll., 523 F.2d 569, 580 (7th Cir. 1975) (former college president entitled to recover
damages for wrongful termination of employment, but not attorney’s fees under § 1983),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Burband v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1975)
(finding a state prisoner who challenged certain prison disciplinary proceedings
under § 1983 was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior
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In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 144 authorizing courts to award
reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases. 145
Congress explicitly referenced Alyeska in crafting the new legislation,
pointing out that every other civil rights law included provisions for
attorney’s fees. 146 As Professor Pamela Karlan explained, “Every significant
contemporary civil rights statute contains some provision for attorney’s fees,
and in 1976, Congress passed a comprehensive attorney’s fee statute that
provides for fees under the most important Reconstruction [e]ra civil rights
statutes as well.” 147
In providing attorney’s fees, Congress recognized the important
role of private parties and their lawyers in enforcing § 1983. 148 The drafters
understood that without providing attorney’s fees, many civil plaintiffs would
be unable to afford counsel. 149 As the legislative history explains, “[i]f private

Coll., 519 F.2d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 1975) (wrongful discharge of “bearded” college president
would not justify award of attorney’s fees under § 1983)).
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). The statute
reads as follows: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of § 1981, 1982, 1983,
and 1986 of this title, Title IX of Public Law 92-318, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Id. at § 1988(b).
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
See S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 4, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912 (“This bill . . . is an appropriate
response to the Alyeska decision. It is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a
category of cases in which attorneys’ fees have been traditionally regarded as appropriate. It
remedies gaps in the language of these civil rights laws by providing the specific authorization
required by the Court in Alyeska, and makes our civil rights laws consistent.”)
Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205
(2003); see also S. REP. 94-1011, 4, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911 (“This decision and
dictum created anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws whereby awards of fees are, according
to Alyeska, suddenly unavailable in the most fundamental civil rights cases.”).
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909–10 (“All of these civil rights laws
depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy
if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important
Congressional policies which these laws contain.”).
See id. at 5910 (“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue
to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer.”); Zarcone v. Perry, 581
F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) (“Its goal was to remove
financial impediments that might preclude or hinder ‘private citizens,’ collectively or
individually, from being ‘able to assert their civil rights.’” (citations omitted)); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 1558, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976) (“The effective enforcement of federal civil
rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of
the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited.
In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate a
court action to correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will
remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations
cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts. In authorizing
144
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citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens
must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court.” 150 In addition, without attorney’s fees, lawyers might avoid
cases that involve only equitable relief, many of which “often do the most to
vindicate important societal interests.” 151
As the Supreme Court acknowledged, the Attorney’s Fees Awards
Act “g[ave] the victims of civil rights violations a powerful weapon that
improves their ability to employ counsel, to obtain access to the courts, and
thereafter to vindicate their rights by means of settlement or trial.” 152 The
addition of attorney’s fees has proven to be “an important tool to ensure
that civil rights laws are enforced.” 153 The impact of the Act was seen
immediately in the number of civil rights cases filed. Within the first five
years, “the number of civil rights cases brought against state and local
governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 increased by two-thirds.” 154 Despite
significant setbacks in recent years in the Supreme Court, 155 and a
an award of reasonable attorney’s fees § 1988 is designed to give such persons effective access
to the judicial process where their grievances can be resolved according to the law.”).
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910. Congress recognized that without
fee awards to promote private enforcement of civil rights laws, these laws would become
“mere hollow pronouncements” out of the reach of victims of racial discrimination. Id. at
6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
Karlan, supra note 147, at 205–06. Indeed, as Professor Karlan explained, such cases,
which often do not involve large damages awards and contingency payouts for lawyers, “are
the ones where plaintiffs function most clearly as private attorneys general.” Id.; see also
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“If successful plaintiffs were
routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position
to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.”).
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741 (1986).
Case Note, Federal Government Litigation—Equal Access to Justice Act—Fourth Circuit
150

151

152
153

Holds That Attorney’s Fees Are Payable to Claimant and Are Eligible for Administrative
Offset—Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV.

792, 797 (2010).
Mark D. Boveri, Note, Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984) (citing Robert A. Diamond,
The Firestorm Over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420 (1983)). According to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, “the number of lawsuits filed against state and local
governments rose from 17,543 in 1976 to 29,173 in 1981.” Id. at 1295 n.14. But see Jose
Roberto Juarez, Jr., The Supreme Court As the Cheshire Cat: Escaping the Section 1983
Wonderland, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 52 (1993) (“While there has been a dramatic increase
in the number of Section 1983 cases filed since the decision in Monroe, there is little
empirical evidence that the federal courts are ‘flooded’ with Section 1983 cases.”).
Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality
and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 198 (1997) (“In the years since Congress enacted
the Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, however, Supreme Court decisions have sanctioned the
practice of permitting waivers of attorneys’ fees as a condition of settlement, imbued Rule 68
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with enormous impact in civil rights cases,
eliminated contingent risk enhancement of fees, and defined the damages available for
154

155

2020]

IMPROVING POLICE OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY

251

proliferation of litigation on the calculation of fee awards, 156 attorney’s fees
remain a critical component to the enforcement of civil rights. 157

2.

How the Supreme Court Has Undermined § 1983

Despite its recognition as restoring the promise of § 1983, 158 the
Monroe decision also marks the beginning of one of the Court’s strikes
against its efficacy. While the Monroe Court provided broad powers to sue
individuals, it foreclosed the option of suing the responsible city government
of a police department. In Monroe, the Court ruled that a municipality was
not a “person” within the meaning of the statute and thus not liable under §
1983. 159 By barring civil rights suits against municipalities and local
governments, the Monroe Court “eviscerated a valuable civil rights
remedy.” 160 Municipal liability was not recognized until seventeen years later
in Monell v. Department of Social Services. 161 However, instead of
respondeat superior, which is recognized in “nearly every other area of
law,” 162 the Court in Monell limited recovery to “when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury . . . .” 163

violations of civil rights in a manner that minimizes the intangible or non-pecuniary character
of many of the federal rights in issue.”).
See Emily M. Calhoun, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of NonNegotiable Fee Awards Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1984)
(“Attorneys frequently request courts to award fees in civil rights cases and, as a result,
litigation over the propriety of fee awards proliferates.”).
See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 610 F. Supp. 29, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“When Congress
created the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, it recognized
the critical nexus between providing for recovery of attorney’s fees and ensuring
enforcement of the civil rights laws.”).
Justice Blackmun, supra note 126, at 19 (“Monroe . . . is correctly credited as being a
watershed in the development of § 1983.”).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191–92 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court explicitly ignored the “policy
considerations” that “doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability because private
remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures are conspicuously ineffective, and
because municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause
those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police level.” Id. at 191.
Conrad K. Harper, The Overthrow of Monroe v. Pape: A Chapter in the Legacy of
Thurgood Marshall, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 39 (1992).
Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 33 (“In almost every other area of law, an employer can be
held liable if its employees, in the scope of their duties, injure others, even negligently. This
encourages employers to control the conduct of their employees and ensures that those
injured will be compensated.”).
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. According to the Court,
156
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The Malignant Growth of Qualified Immunity

Although addressing attorney’s fees lowered a significant barrier to
plaintiffs, the largest barrier to recovery for damages for police misconduct
comes from qualified immunity. As studies consistently show, “nearly all of
the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity cases come out the same way—by
finding immunity.” 164 As Professor Joanna Schwartz recently concluded,
“[s]ince 2005, when John Roberts became Chief Justice, the Court has
granted certiorari to consider twenty qualified immunity denials, and ruled
in the government’s favor every time.” 165 The Court has now “made clear
that an officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity remains stronger than
ever.” 166
The concept of qualified immunity has existed in tort law since the
nineteenth century, leaving the question of whether an officer exercised
good faith for the jury to decide at trial. 167 But “common law qualified
immunity is different from that which has been developed by federal courts
construing civil rights claims.” 168 The Supreme Court removed the question
of good faith from the inquiry and converted a subjective test that was a

[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the same
legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In
particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.
Id. at 691. For a survey of the various critiques of the Monell decision, see Edward C.
Dawson, Replacing Monell Liability with Qualified Immunity for Municipal Defendants in
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 483, 504 (2018) (“The Monell doctrine has
drawn significant criticism and critique by both jurists and scholars.”); see also City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If the action of
a police officer is far more serious than an ordinary state tort because it is made possible by
his position, the underlying reason that such an action is a matter of federal concern is that
it is treated as the action of the officer’s employer. If the doctrine of respondeat
superior would impose liability on the city in an ordinary tort case, a fortiori, that doctrine
must apply to the city in a § 1983 case.”).
See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 82–83
(2018) (“In the thirty-five years since it announced the objective-reasonableness standard
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court has applied it in thirty qualified immunity cases. Only twice
has the Court actually found official conduct to violate clearly established law.”).
Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (2020).
Wayne S. Melnick, Sun S. Choy & A. Ali Sabzevari, Flash-Bang Use: The Militarization
of Police and the Status of Qualified Immunity, DRI FOR DEF., June 2017, at 24, 26.
Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State
Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 526 (1998).
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question of fact for the jury into a question of law that allows courts to
dismiss claims before ever reaching a fact finder. 169
The Supreme Court began the process of undermining § 1983
claims when it first recognized the availability of the qualified immunity
defense for police officers in 1967. 170 Despite any references to immunity in
the statute itself or in the legislative history of the original Act, 171 the Court
decided that the common law protected police officers from suit when they
acted in good faith. 172 The rise of qualified immunity was likely the Court’s
response to a growth in constitutional tort claims, which began to rise after
Monroe was decided in 1961. 173 Courts generally became concerned that
“many of these lawsuits were frivolous and that defending them imposed
both societal and individual costs.” 174
See id. (“The more recent objective inquiry established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald is purely a
creature of civil rights law.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)
(acknowledging that the Court has “completely reformulated qualified immunity along
principles not at all embodied in the common law”).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). Notably, the Court in Pierson never used the
phrase “qualified immunity.” Instead, the Court observed that “[t]he legislative record gives
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.”
Id. at 554. The Court also noted that “the prevailing view in this country [is that] a peace
officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because
the innocence of the suspect is later proved.” Id. The Court then held that “the defense of
good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in
the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the
action under § 1983.” Id. at 557.
Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN.
L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 78 (2016) (“[Q]ualified immunity is a doctrine—and a limitation on
that statute—that is entirely the Court’s creation, devoid of support in § 1983’s legislative
history.”).
See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556–57 (“Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of
police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause.”). Tort law
had also been important to the Court in Monroe, where the Court said § 1983 “should be
read against the background of tort liability.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 122, at 428 (tracking the “phenomenal” growth in
§ 1983 litigation in the thirty years after Monroe). The rise in the number of cases was due
to many factors, including the adoption of attorney’s fees and the general growth in federal
litigation during the 1980s. Id. at 428–29; see also Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937, 1938–39 (2018) (noting that other
contributing factors likely included extending the exclusionary rule to state courts under
Mapp v. Ohio and recognizing a damages action against federal officials for constitutional
violations under Bivens).
Chen, supra note 173, at 1938–39 (identifying three categories of such costs that the Court
found concerning, including: (1) the unfairness of imposing financial liability on officials who
might not understand the nuances of constitutional doctrine; (2) the risk that officials would
hesitate when required to act if they were concerned that their actions could subject them to
a lawsuit (“overdeterrence”); and (3) being subject to the burdens of the judicial process
would cost police officers time, distract them from their jobs, and require them to incur
litigation expenses).
169
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The Court has steadily expanded the reach of qualified immunity. 175
Within a few years of establishing qualified immunity in § 1983 cases, the
Court began to shift from common law interpretation to imposing an
objective standard that government officials had a responsibility to know the
law. 176 Thereafter, the Court established qualified immunity as a shield
against lawsuits, not merely as a defense to be raised at trial. 177 In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 178 the Court eliminated the inquiry into an officer’s subjective
intent and put the emphasis squarely on whether the officer’s conduct was
objectively reasonable. 179 The Court was now making it possible for an
officer, even acting in bad faith, to be immune from suit through qualified
immunity. 180

See Kinports, supra note 171, at 78 (“In recent years, the Supreme Court opinions applying
the qualified immunity defense have engaged in a pattern of describing the defense in
increasingly generous terms and qualifying and deviating from past precedent—without
offering any justification or even acknowledgement of the Court’s departure from prior case
law.”); see also Baude, supra note 164, at 81 (explaining the “unusual degree” to which the
Court has “openly tinkered” with qualified immunity to negative effect).
The Court reasoned that “the appropriate standard necessarily contains elements of both”
subjective and objective factors. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975), abrogated
by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). According to the Court, under § 1983, officials
“must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also on
knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.” Id. at 322. In
extending qualified immunity to school district officials, the Court ruled that “an act violating
a student’s constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled,
indisputable law on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students’ daily lives than by
the presence of actual malice.” Id. at 321.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) (“[S]uits concerning constitutional
violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion
for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity.”). As the Court put it, “plaintiffs
may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits.” Id.; see also Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985) (“[T]he denial of qualified immunity should be similarly
[immediately] appealable.”); Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 10 (“[W]hen a defendant
appeals an adverse ruling on qualified immunity, the appeal brings an immediate halt to all
proceedings in the trial court. The effect of this, of course, is to make it much more difficult
for a civil rights plaintiff to pursue a claim.”).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
The Court decided that “[t]he subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has
proved incompatible with our admonition that insubstantial claims should not proceed to
trial.” Id. at 815–16 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (stating “an
officer’s actual intentions are irrelevant”); see also Joanna Schwartz, The Case Against
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1802 (2018) (“Even when a plaintiff
can demonstrate that a defendant was acting in bad faith, that evidence is considered
irrelevant to the qualified immunity analysis.”).
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Lastly, the Court imposed the standard that the conduct in question
must violate “clearly established law.” 181 As the Court now makes clear,
qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” 182 The Court requires that “existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 183
Whether the right at issue was clearly established involves an analysis of
precedent to determine whether it “squarely governs the case” before the
court. 184 As one circuit judge put it, “[m]erely proving a constitutional
deprivation doesn’t cut it; plaintiffs must cite functionally identical
precedent that places the legal question ‘beyond debate’ to ‘every’
reasonable officer.” 185

b.

Qualified Immunity – The Current State

The vast expansion of qualified immunity has played out with
distressing results. Courts “aggressively dismiss[] civil rights cases on the
ground of qualified immunity.” 186 The Court watches lower courts like a
hawk, closely monitoring any motions denying qualified immunity and
placing outsized attention on the issue. 187 The Court has managed to draw
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). Qualified immunity shields police
officers from lawsuits based on official conduct if reasonable officers in the same position
could have believed their conduct was “lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information the . . . officers possessed” at the time. Id. at 641. According to the Court, “[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 640; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 528 (1985) (finding that officials are immune unless “the law clearly proscribed the
actions” they took).
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986) (“Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be
recognized.”).
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004).
Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Willett expressed his “broader unease with the real-world
functioning of modern immunity practice.” Id. In a scathing rebuke of the Supreme Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence, he concluded that “[t]o some observers, qualified
immunity smacks of unqualified impunity,” because public officials are allowed to “duck
consequences for bad behavior—no matter how palpably unreasonable—as long as they were
the first to behave badly.” Id.
Hon. Adelman, supra note 29, at 9 (reporting that a recent survey found that courts
dismissed approximately seventy-two percent of claims, and “most of the dismissals were
based on a determination that the plaintiff failed to present a sufficiently similar precedent”).
See, e.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1780 n.3 (2015)
(“[T]he Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual officers to
liability.”); see also Baude, supra note 164, at 48 (“Essentially, the Court’s agenda is to
especially ensure that lower courts do not improperly deny any immunity. This approach
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criticism from a wide range of ideological perspectives on its application of
qualified immunity. 188 Even Justices from different ideological camps have
openly questioned the Court’s approach to qualified immunity. 189 And
numerous scholars have criticized the doctrine, 190 illustrating example after
example of the miscarriage of justice in the pursuit of such unexamined
deference to police officers. 191 As Justice Sotomayor explained, the balance
sends a strong signal to lower courts and elevates official-protective qualified immunity cases
to a level of attention exceeded only by the Court’s state-protective habeas docket.”).
See, e.g., Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring Official Accountability,
Restoring the Public’s Trust in Law Enforcement, and Promoting the Rule of Law as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Baxter v. Bracy, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018) (No.
18-1287), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (“Amici reflect an extensive cross-ideological
and cross-professional consensus that this Court’s qualified immunity case law undermines
accountability, harming citizens and public officials alike. . . . The diversity of the signatories
reflects how qualified immunity abets and exacerbates the violation of constitutional rights of
every sort—including the rights to freedom of speech and religious exercise, to keep and bear
arms, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, to be free from racial discrimination, and to pursue a lawful occupation, just to
name a few.”).
See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity
. . . we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute.”); Wyatt v. Cole,
504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In the context of qualified immunity .
. . we have diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards.”); Kisela v. Hughes,
138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating the Court’s “one-sided
approach to qualified immunity” has “transform[ed] the doctrine into an absolute shield for
law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment”).
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 165, at 311–12 (“[T]here have been growing calls by courts,
as well as by a number of commentators and advocacy organizations across the political
spectrum, to reconsider qualified immunity or do away with the defense altogether.”); Karen
M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1887, 1892 (2018) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity is beyond repair.”); Baude, supra
note 164, at 88 (arguing the doctrine “lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications
are unpersuasive”); Kinports, supra note 171, at 78 (finding that the “increasingly broad
brush” with which the Supreme Court has categorized the qualified immunity defense will
likely increase protections for government defendants); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About
Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 232 (2006) (arguing the Supreme Court has
increasingly treated qualified immunity like absolute immunity—that is, as a total bar on suits
against government officials).
One of several examples comes from one of the most progressive circuits in the nation,
illustrating just how widespread the issue is throughout the federal court system. The Ninth
Circuit upheld a grant of qualified immunity to a police officer who, during a routine traffic
stop, directed the vehicle’s driver to sit on the officer’s cruiser, pointed a gun at the driver’s
head, and threatened to kill him if he declined to surrender on weapons charges when the
officer discovered a gun in the backseat. Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir.
2018). The court granted qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of the officer’s actions
had not been clearly established under the circumstances because the stop had occurred at
night, the driver had a prior conviction for unlawful firearms possession, and the driver
“stood six feet tall,” “weighed two hundred and sixty-five pounds,” and “was only 10–15 feet
away” from the gun. Id.; see also Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953,
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tips too favorably toward the police, as the Court now “tells officers that they
can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably
unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.” 192

3.

The New Federalism – States Take Over As Federal Courts Have
Failed

States have the power to restore the original promise of § 1983 by
creating an equivalent statute under state law. Ironically, it may now be left
to state courts to provide the sort of accountability that federal courts were
assigned 160 years ago in the Ku Klux Klan Act: it could be up to the states
to prosecute what the federal government cannot. 193 Looking to state law
when federal courts have restricted civil rights is not new, of course. As
Justice Brennan wrote over forty years ago in the face of growing resistance
in federal court to desegregation and other issues, “the very premise of the
cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts
to step into the breach.” 194 Justice Brennan was writing in “response to the
968 (2017) (collecting cases from the Supreme Court demonstrating that
“[t]he Court’s veneration of police officers has not abated in recent years”); Katherine Mims
Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1407
(2019) (collecting other recent cases from the Supreme Court and answering the question,
“why does qualified immunity matter? Among other reasons, because it excuses conduct that
seems inexcusable.”).
See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Of course, the law may not be the only reason why state courts could be better venues for
prosecuting civil rights. The federal bench is becoming less and less diverse demographically
and by legal experience. See, e.g., Maggie Jo Buchanan, The Startling Lack of Professional
Diversity Among Federal Judges, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 17, 2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2020/06/17/486366/startling-lackprofessional-diversity-among-federal-judges/ [https://perma.cc/LW5J-WHBP] (“According
to the Federal Judicial Center, only around 1 percent total of all federal appellate judges
spent the majority of their careers as public defenders or legal aid attorneys.”); Elie Mystal,
Donald Trump and the Plot to Take Over the Courts, THE NATION (July 15, 2019),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-mcconnel-court-judges-plot/
[https://perma.cc/TR3D-59KB] (“They’re hostile to minority voting rights and claims of
racial or gender discrimination. They’re largely young and inexperienced, and an unsettling
number have earned their stripes as partisan think-tank writers, op-ed columnists, or even
bloggers.”); Andrew Cohen, Trump and McConnell’s Overwhelmingly White Male Judicial
Appointments, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/trump-and-mcconnells-overwhelmingly-white-male-judicialappointments [https://perma.cc/5MXM-ANN4] (“In his first 40 months in office, Trump
already has filled about 30 percent of the positions in the country’s federal appeals courts,
where most of federal law is settled. Not a single one of Trump’s 53 confirmed appeals court
nominees is Black. Only a single confirmed appeals court nominee is Latino.”).
Justice William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977). One generation earlier, Justice Brandeis made a similar call
for more state-based efforts. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
192
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Burger Court’s increasingly conservative interpretation of the federal
constitution.” 195 Until now, however, examples of using state courts to
promote civil rights have been few and far between. 196

a.

Examples from Other States

A state-equivalent § 1983 statute is the logical next step to overcome
what has happened to the federal version. Colorado has already taken such
a step. Shortly after the killing of George Floyd amidst protests at the state
Capitol, 197 and with remarkable bipartisan support, 198 Colorado enacted
Senate Bill 20–217 (“SB-217”). 199 Hailed as “The Law Enforcement
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
Caroline Davidson, State Constitutions and the Humane Treatment of Arrestees and
Pretrial Detainees, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 4–5 (2014).
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard
individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective
role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten that one of
the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source of
protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism is not served when
the federal half of that protection is crippled.
Justice Brennan, supra note 194, at 502–03.
Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent
State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 783 (2011) (“The promise of ‘the New
Judicial Federalism’—of the independent interpretation by state courts of state constitutional
corollaries to the federal Bill of Rights—has gone largely unfulfilled. . . . [I]ndependent state
constitutionalism . . . is today more an aspiration than a practice.”). But see Jim
Hilbert, Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to Challenge
School Segregation, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4 (2017) (discussing how state constitutional claims
can address school segregation).
The protests had an impact. As Colorado State Representative and co-author of the bill
Leslie Herod recalled, “Every day we would go into the capitol, and by about noon, we would
start to hear chants from the crowd, . . . [like,] ‘Pass 217! I can’t breathe.[’] [Then] eight
minutes, forty-six seconds of silence. That gets in people’s minds.” Berman, supra note 41.
The Colorado Senate approved the bill nearly unanimously by a vote of thirty-three to two,
and the House passed it by a vote of fifty-two to thirteen. Alex Burness & Saja Hindi, How
Colorado Found the Political Will to Pass a Sweeping Police Reform Law in Just 16 Days,
DENVER POST (June 19, 2020), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/06/19/colorado-policereform-accountability-bill/ [https://perma.cc/L9UT-BBPA].
Representative Herod acknowledged the broad implications of the new bill. See Nick
Sibilla, Colorado Passes Landmark Law Against Qualified Immunity, Creates New Way to
Protect
Civil
Rights,
FORBES
MAG.
(June
21,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/06/21/colorado-passes-landmark-law-againstqualified-immunity-creates-new-way-to-protect-civil-rights/#11b3e3cb378a
[https://perma.cc/2VS7-LSDE] (quoting Representative and co-sponsor Leslie Herod,
“Generations of Coloradans and communities across the country have been waiting far too
long for this historic moment. . . . Together, we’ve made real change to address the violence
and brutality that Black and Brown communities have endured at the hands of law
enforcement.”). Representative Herod had tried to implement narrower reforms earlier in
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Integrity and Accountability Act,” SB-217 implements a wide range of major
policing reforms, including mandatory body-worn cameras, 200 annual
reporting on the use of force, 201 prohibitions on the use of projectiles and
chemical agents in response to protests, 202 new limits on the general use of
force, 203 including a ban on the use of choke holds, 204 and a duty to intervene
on the part of officers who witness fellow officers use excessive force. 205
While those reforms are important changes to Colorado law and
represent significant improvements, a unique aspect of the legislation was
the creation of a § 1983 state-equivalent. 206 Similar to its federal counterpart,
SB-217 created a civil action for anyone whose state constitutional rights are
deprived by a police officer acting “under color of law.” 207 Importantly, SB217 makes explicit that “[q]ualified immunity is not a defense to liability
pursuant to this section.” 208 SB-217 also grants attorney’s fees to prevailing
parties. 209 By denying qualified immunity and providing attorney’s fees, the

the year in response to the death of Elijah McClain in Aurora, Colorado. Berman, supra
note 41. Were it not for the pandemic, the Colorado Legislature would have already
adjourned by the time of the killing of George Floyd. Id. McClain died after being placed in
a choke hold by police and then injected with the sedative ketamine. See generally Lucy
Tompkins, Here’s What You Need to Know About Elijah McClain’s Death, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-was-elijah-mcclain.html
[https://perma.cc/3LK5-ZA6N].
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-31-902, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2020) (effective July 1, 2023)
(requiring any recordings relevant to a complaint of officer misconduct be released to the
public within twenty-one days).
Id. § 24-31-903.
Id. § 24-31-905.
COLO. § 18-1-707.
Id. subdiv. 2.5(a).
Id. § 18-8-802.
Jay Schwiekert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate
Qualified Immunity, CATO INST. (June 22, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/coloradopasses-historic-bipartisan-policing-reforms-eliminate-qualified-immunity
[https://perma.cc/P23W-5RV7] (observing that Colorado “is the first state to specifically
negate the availability of qualified immunity as a defense through legislation” and
praising the ACLU of Colorado for “tremendous wisdom in recognizing that any civil rights
legislation would need to specifically address and negate the defense of qualified immunity”).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131, subdiv. 1 (West 2020) (stating that a police officer
who “under color of law” deprives any person of rights protected under Article II of the
Colorado State Constitution “is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable or any other
appropriate relief”).
Id. subdiv. 2(b). The Act also removes liability caps and excludes other immunities. See
id. subdiv. 2(a) (“Statutory immunities and statutory limitations on liability, damages, or
attorney feeds do not apply to claims brought pursuant to this section.”).
Id. subdiv. 3 (“In any action brought pursuant to this section, a court shall award reasonable
attorney fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff.”).
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Colorado legislation essentially takes the best of § 1983 without the baggage
of the limitations that federal courts have imposed over the past sixty years. 210
While certainly the most ambitious, Colorado’s remarkable police
reform in summer 2020 is not the first legislation to create a state-equivalent
§ 1983 statute. 211 The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“the MCRA”), which
is also known as “little 1983” or the “baby civil rights bill,” was the first and
most fully-developed state civil rights statute. 212 The Massachusetts
Legislature acted to overcome “the challenge posed by the Supreme Court’s
retrenchment on civil rights.” 213 Enacted “in response to problems of racial
violence and harassment,” 214 the MCRA authorizes a private right of action

In addition, SB-217 limits indemnification and requires officers to contribute to any
damages assessed against them, but only if the officer’s employer “determines that the officer
did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief that the action was lawful.” Id. subdiv. 4.
In such cases, the officer is “personally liable and shall not be indemnified . . . for five percent
of the judgment or settlement or twenty-five thousand dollars, whichever is less.” Id. The
Colorado legislation is silent on respondeat superior liability, but Colorado law already
recognizes the doctrine in its state tort law and may incorporate it into SB-217 automatically.
See Rowe v. Parks, No. 06-01192, 2007 WL 683989, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 2007)
(citing Stokes v. Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP, 159 P.3d 691 (Colo. App. 2006))
(“[U]nder Colorado law, the doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer is
liable for the torts of an employee acting within the scope of employment.”).
In addition to Colorado, Connecticut has also passed legislation that could limit the
application of qualified immunity in state-based claims against police officers, but the
Connecticut law includes a governmental immunity exemption for police officers who “at the
time of the conduct complained of, . . . had an objectively good faith belief that such officer’s
conduct did not violate the law.” See An Act Concerning Police Accountability, H.B. 6004,
2020 Sess. (Conn. 2020), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2020/act/Pa/pdf/2020PA-00001-R00HB06004SS1-PA.PDF [https://perma.cc/3FMR-6UYX]; see also Nick Sibilla, New Connecticut
Law Limits Police Immunity in Civil Rights Lawsuits, But Loopholes Remain, FORBES MAG.
(July 31, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/07/31/new-connecticut-lawlimits-police-immunity-in-civil-rights-lawsuits-but-loopholes-remain/?sh=4fc56edace8d
[https://perma.cc/6RXM-574Z] (concluding “the new law contains multiple loopholes that
undermine its effectiveness”).
Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 167, at 544.
Ian F. Haney Lopez, Recent Development, An Act Relative to Civil Rights Under Law–
Massachusetts General Laws Ch. 93, S 102 (1989), 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 147, 163
(1990) (“As the Supreme Court of the United States has pulled back from the enforcement
of civil rights, those seeking redress for violation of their rights have looked increasingly to
state laws and to the state courts.” (quoting the Boston Bar Association, Proposed Civil Rights
Legislation Explanatory Statement Presented in Advance of the Legislation)).
O’Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Mass. 1987). In signing the bill, Governor
Dukakis stated that the MCRA “reinstates the employment discrimination protection of the
1976 Supreme Court Runyon v. McCrary ruling which was partially overturned in June
by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.” Lopez, supra note 213, at 157. The act has also
extended to sexual harassment. O’Connell, 511 N.E.2d at 353 (“Sexual harassment
accomplished by threats, intimidation, or coercion constitutes precisely the kind of conduct
proscribed by the act.”).
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in state court for violation of state and federal civil rights. 215 The MCRA, like
other civil rights statutes, is remedial and “is entitled to liberal construction
of its terms.” 216 As an example of the possibilities of using state law to exceed
federal court limitations, the MCRA goes beyond what is allowed in federal
civil rights cases by including actions performed by non-state, private
actors. 217
In addition to Colorado and Massachusetts, three other states have
created statutes similar to § 1983. 218 A handful of states have enacted more
limited provisions that allow claims for violations of only certain rights. 219
The majority of state legislatures, however, “have not affirmatively
established a civil action to recover damages for the deprivation of state
constitutional rights.” 220
One important limitation on previous state-based § 1983 statutes is
that they import federal jurisprudence with respect to qualified immunity.
The text of other state civil rights statutes “is typically cast in general
terms.” 221 As Professor Gary Gildin observes, “[a]bsent unambiguous
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11I (1996) (“Any person whose exercise or
enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights
secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or
attempted to be interfered with, as described in § 11H, may institute and prosecute in his
own name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable
relief as provided for in said section, including the award of compensatory money
damages.”).
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Mass. 1985).
See Chaabouni v. City of Boston, 133 F. Supp. 2d 93, 100–01 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The
purpose of the MCRA was to provide a state remedy for deprivation of civil rights extending
beyond the limits of federal law by incorporating private action within its bounds. . . . Thus,
the Legislature intended to provide a remedy under state law coextensive with the federal
remedy except that the federal statute requires state action whereas the MCRA does not.”
(citation omitted)).
See, e.g., Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (2006);
Tom Bane Civil Rights Act of 1993, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) & (b) (West 1997); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682, 1-A (West 1996); see also Donoghue and Edelstein, supra note
167, at 541 (noting that “[t]he idea of a civil rights statute at the state level is a relatively new
one in American law” and “[p]rior to 1977, only federal law provided a statutory cause of
action for damages for violation of constitutional rights”).
Nebraska also has a civil rights statute, but it is limited to private employment
discrimination cases. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-148 (1997); see also Wiseman v.
Keller, 358 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Neb. 1984) (discussing the legislative history of the Nebraska
civil rights act and indicating it was limited to private employment discrimination cases);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1983) (recognizing claim by employee disciplined
or discharged because of exercise of right of expression or religious belief as provided
by state constitution); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-E:1 (2017) (protecting state employees’
right of freedom of speech); New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:6-2 (West
2014) (providing a private cause of action where interference state constitutional protections
was made through “threats, intimidation, or coercion”).
Gildin, supra note 102, at 885.
Id. at 887.
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guidance from the statutory text, courts may turn to what superficially
appears to be the most analogous authority—relevant Supreme Court
doctrine on defenses available to those same state and local officials and
entities when they violate the federal constitution.” 222 This is precisely what
Massachusetts courts have done. According to the Massachusetts Supreme
Court, “[w]e presume that the Legislature was aware of this case law [on
qualified immunity] when it chose to pattern the Massachusetts Civil Rights
Act after § 1983.” 223 As a result, the MCRA “affords qualified immunity to
public officials to the same extent that § 1983 does.” 224
Minnesota legislators would be wise to look to their colleagues to
the West for ideas on improving how Minnesota law might handle police
misconduct in the civil context, as Colorado avoids this issue by explicitly
stating that qualified immunity does not apply. Minnesota courts have
already signaled that qualified immunity, or other similar immunity, would
likely apply in a state-based § 1983 claim without explicitly prohibiting the
defense. 225 As the Minnesota Supreme Court instructed, “[i]f a statutory
enactment is to abrogate common law, the abrogation must be by express
wording or necessary implication.” 226 A Minnesota state-based § 1983 claim
could avoid qualified immunity (and the lack of respondeat superior)
through clear drafting to explicitly prohibit the defense. 227

b.

The Present State of Minnesota Civil Law and Police Abuse

Currently, under Minnesota state law, civil remedies for police
abuse are available only through tort law. 228 Like the vast majority of states,
222

Id.

Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989); see also Lyons v. Nat’l Car Rental
Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Accordingly, we look to cases construing the
federal Civil Rights Act for guidance [in interpreting MCRA cases].”).
See Rodriques v. Furtado, 575 N.E.2d 1124, 1127 (Mass. 1991) (explaining that the
MCRA “intended to adopt the standard of immunity for public officials developed under 42
U.S.C. 1983”).
State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. 1994) (applying
official immunity to Minnesota Human Rights Act because “this court has long followed the
presumption that statutory enactments are consistent with common law doctrines”).
223

224

225

226

Id.

While not a focus of this article, one other clear advantage that a state-based § 1983 statute
could have is the application of respondeat superior. Under Minnesota law, municipalities
may be liable for the misconduct of their police officers under the doctrine. Yang v. City of
Brooklyn Park, 194 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875 (D. Minn. 2016) (citing Watson by Hanson v.
Metro. Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn.1996)). The U.S. Supreme Court
eliminated such liability from § 1983 five decades ago. See supra notes 159–63 and
accompanying text.
Police may also be subject to discrimination claims under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act. In June 2020, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights opened an investigation
into the Minneapolis Police Department, claiming that the killing of George Floyd and other
227
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Minnesota does not have a statutory equivalent of § 1983. 229 Additionally,
with a few important exceptions, 230 there is (almost) no private right of action
for violations of the state constitution, let alone for violations by police. 231
Plaintiffs using state law to prosecute police abuse are stuck with similar
challenges of immunity issues, and unlike § 1983, there are generally no
attorney’s fees included with available remedies.

incidents “similar to it since at least January 1, 2010 and continuing to the present” require
investigation into whether the department’s “training, policies, procedures, practices,
including but not limited to use of force protocols, and any corresponding implementation,
amounts to unlawful race-based policing, which deprives People of Color, particularly Black
community members, of their civil rights.” Minnesota Department of Human Rights, Charge
of Discrimination, Minneapolis Police Department (Respondent), June 2, 2020 (on file with
author).
See Jihad v. Fabian, No. 09-1604 (SRN/LIB), 2011 WL 1641885, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb.
17, 2011) (“Minnesota has not enacted a statute that is equivalent to § 1983”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1641767, at *3 (D. Minn. May 2, 2011); Riehm v.
Engelking, No. 06-293 (JRT/RLE), 2007 WL 37799, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 2007)
(dismissing claims under Minnesota Constitution because “[u]nlike 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Minnesota has no statutory scheme providing for private actions based on violations
of the Minnesota Constitution”); Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961, 975 (D. Minn. 2005)
(finding that “Minnesota has not enacted a statute equivalent to § 1983”).
See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302–03 (Minn. 1993) (permitting lawsuit by school
districts with low property-tax bases alleging that state school financing formula violates
Education Clauses and Equal Protection guarantees of the Minnesota Constitution);
Knudtson v. City of Coates, 506 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (enjoining
prohibition on non-obscene nude dancing under free expression provision to Minnesota
Constitution); Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904–05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d on
other grounds, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) (striking down welfare statute disfavoring new
Minnesotans under Equal Protection guarantees of the Federal and Minnesota
Constitutions); McGovern v. City of Minneapolis, 480 N.W.2d 121, 126–27 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (permitting owners of houses damaged in police actions to obtain compensation from
the City of Minneapolis under the state constitution’s takings clause); Wegner v. Milwaukee
Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41–42 (Minn. 1991), reh’g denied, (Jan. 27, 1992) (holding
that a municipality is not insulated from liability to homeowners under doctrine of public
necessity); see also Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d 400, 409 (Minn. 1944)
(permitting hybrid tort/constitutional lawsuit against officials but not the town); Thomsen v.
Ross, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 975–76 (D. Minn. 2005) (“The Court is mindful of the remedies
clause of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides a ‘certain remedy in the laws’ for
injuries and wrongs . . . . Here, the Court assumes, without deciding, that a Minnesota court
would recognize a private right of action to remedy violations of Article I, sections 6, 7
and 10.” (citations omitted)).
See Eggenberger v. W. Albany Twp., 820 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]here is no
private cause of action for violations of the Minnesota Constitution.”); see also Mlnarik v.
City of Minnetrista, No. A09–910, 2010 WL 346402, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2010)
(explaining “no private cause of action for a violation of the Minnesota constitution has yet
been recognized”); Danforth v. Eling, No. A10-130, 2010 WL 4068791, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 19, 2010) (noting “there is no private cause of action for violations of the
Minnesota Constitution”).
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First, immunity defenses provide a barrier to tort claims. Police
officers in Minnesota may avoid state tort actions through the application of
another affirmative defense—official immunity. 232 The defense applies to
“discretionary duties,” 233 and it requires that plaintiffs prove a “willful or
malicious wrong” by defendants to overcome the defense. 234 Under
Minnesota law, the decision to use deadly force is a discretionary decision
entitling a police officer to official immunity absent a willful or malicious
wrong. 235
In determining whether an official has committed a malicious
wrong, Minnesota courts “consider whether the official has intentionally
committed an act that he or she had reason to believe is prohibited.” 236
Importantly, this “contemplates less of a subjective inquiry into malice,
which was traditionally favored at common law, and more of an objective
inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an official’s actions.” 237 The defense
applies even if officers take intentional action that could support an

Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (en banc).
Under Minnesota law, a public official is entitled to official immunity from state law claims
when the official’s duties require the exercise of discretion or judgment. Johnson v. Morris,
453 N.W.2d 31, 41 (Minn. 1990). As opposed to “discretionary” duties, “an [o]fficial duty is
ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a
specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677. On the
other hand, the commissioner of corrections and a prison warden had discretionary duties
in supervising the prison industries program, insulating those officials from liability for a
negligence claim arising from a prison factory incident. Susla v. State, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912
(Minn. 1976) (en banc). Not surprisingly, the distinction between “discretionary” and
“ministerial” duties has been subject to “enigmatic application and occasional
breakdown.” Papenhausen v. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1978).
Susla, 247 N.W.2d at 912.
Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571–72 (Minn. 1994).
Id. at 571. Courts regularly determine that, where the use of force was not objectively
unreasonable, it was also not willful or malicious. Henderson v. City of Woodbury, 233 F.
Supp. 3d 723, 732–33 (D. Minn. 2017); see also Hayek v. City of St. Paul, 488 F.3d 1049,
1056 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Because the officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable, a reasonable
fact-finder could not conclude the officers’ conduct was willful or malicious.”).
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intentional tort claim. 238 Official immunity also extends to protect
government entities from vicarious liability for an official’s actions. 239
The analysis for determining whether official immunity applies
“is similar, but not identical,” to the analysis of qualified immunity in § 1983
actions. 240 As with the federal standard for § 1983 cases, an official seeking
protection through official immunity in Minnesota must show that (1) his or
her conduct was “legally reasonable,” or (2) “no clearly established law or
regulation prohibited [the] conduct.” 241 Minnesota rejected the argument
that federal law supplanted the Minnesota common law doctrine of official
immunity in part because the Minnesota Supreme Court determined
that Harlow “completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles
not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective
malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into
the legal reasonableness of the official action.” 242
The Minnesota official immunity doctrine and the federal qualified
immunity doctrine differ with respect to the analysis of “legal
reasonableness.” 243 In Elwood v. Rice County, 244 the Minnesota Supreme
Court declined to adopt the federal governmental immunity analysis to
common law official immunity as applied to state tort claims because the
U.S. Supreme Court had eliminated the subjective “good faith” component
Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding immunity for
state tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rico v. State, 472
N.W.2d 100, 102–06 (Minn. 1991) (finding immunity for an official who fired a former
employee, even if the official intentionally committed an act later determined to be
wrong); Johnson, 453 N.W.2d at 42 (finding immunity for shooting out tires and handcuffing
a man who evaded arrest even though those same actions would otherwise be
battery); Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 674 (finding immunity on claims of battery and trespass).
Of course, the court is careful to add, “The doctrine protects honest law enforcement efforts,
and is not intended to shield police brutality.” Id. at 679.
Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 1998); see also Mike
Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 239,
252 (2006) (“If official immunity applies to a government official, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has made the decision to extend vicarious official immunity to the governmental entity
employing that official.”).
Galarnyk v. Fraser, No. 08-3351 (JMR/AJ), 2009 WL 2929428, at *9 (D. Minn. June 25,
2009) (citing Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309, 317–18
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d in part, 582 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 1998)); see also Greiner v. City
of Champlin, 816 F. Supp. 528, 545 (D. Minn. 1993), decision rescinded, 27 F.3d 1346 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“While qualified immunity and official immunity are distinct concepts, the tests
are similar.”).
Compare Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”), with Rico, 472
N.W.2d at 107 (“[N]o clearly established law or regulation prohibited [the] conduct.”).
Ellwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677. Accordingly, the court held that “[w]e decline to simply
apply the federal standard in all state tort actions.” Id.
Gleason, 563 N.W.2d at 317.
423 N.W.2d at 677.
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of legal reasonableness. 245 Despite this, some Minnesota cases have
sometimes “indicated favor for the federal standard and the federal courts’
attempts to isolate purely legal questions on which to decide the applicability
of immunity.” 246 But the court has retained reference to the subjective “good
faith” component of legal reasonableness in stating its test. 247 The Minnesota
test is three parts. “Immunity for the discretionary act applies when the
official demonstrates: (1) the conduct was ‘objectively’ legally reasonable,
that is, legally justified under the circumstances; (2) the conduct was
‘subjectively’ reasonable, that is, taken with subjective good faith; or (3) the
right allegedly violated was not clearly established, that is, there was no basis
for knowing the conduct would violate the plaintiff’s rights.” 248
Also, unlike § 1983 claims, Minnesota courts generally do not
provide for attorney’s fees for tort claims against police officers. 249 Minnesota
follows the American rule, which “prevents a party from shifting its attorney
fees to its adversary without a specific contract or statutory authorization.” 250
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the subjective “good faith” component because it
typically involved fact questions requiring resolution by a jury and was therefore contrary to
the purpose of immunity which is to protect officials from suit. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Gleason, 563 N.W.2d at 317; see, e.g., Carter v. Cole, 539 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1995)
(citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (adopting federal reasoning for separating
appeals challenging evidence sufficiency, a fact-based question, from appeals of immunity
denials, a legal question); Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 108 (“[F]ederal decisions interpreting
qualified immunity under § 1983, though certainly not conclusive, are instructive when we
examine an official immunity issue because § 1983 qualified immunity and common law
official immunity further the same purpose.”).
See State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994) (The
standard contemplates “less of a subjective inquiry into malice, which was traditionally
favored at common law, and more of an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an
official’s actions.”). The “subjective inquiry into malice” does not refer to the question of
whether the official was acting with animus. See id. Malice in the context of immunity
connotes a concept unrelated to “ill will” or “improper motive.” See Rico, 472 N.W.2d at
107 n.5 (distinguishing malice in the defamation context).
Gleason, 563 N.W.2d at 318. Though, as the court acknowledged, “it is the rare case in
which the ‘subjective component’ of legal reasonableness will be relevant or a viable theory
for the defendant seeking to avoid suit.” Id. at 318. Rather, the “subjective component”
allows an official to argue that, despite the lack of an “objective” legal justification for the
violation, the offending acts were taken in good faith. Id.; see Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 107.
See generally John M. Bjorkman, Minnesota and the American Rule: The Recoverability
of Attorneys’ Fees Following In Re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 541, 543–46 (2003) (discussing the history of the American rule in
Minnesota).
Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 1998); see also Irwin v. Surdyk’s
Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“That fees may not
be shifted in the absence of a statute or contract was settled more than 100 years ago in this
state. With limited exception, this court has consistently adhered to the American Rule.”
(citations omitted)); see generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575–78 (1993)
(describing the origin and history of the American Rule).
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The exception to the American rule is when legislatures enact fee-shifting
provisions in statutes, like Congress did in § 1983. 251 While tort claims in
the state do not have this provision, Minnesota has enacted several hundred
statutes authorizing attorney’s fees for other claims. 252

B.

Proposal No. 2: Require that Police Officers Carry Individual
Professional Liability Insurance

Employment and labor laws create their own set of barriers to
holding police officers accountable. 253 Supervisors have increasingly limited
ability to discipline and fire police officers no matter how egregious their
conduct because of arbitration provisions in police union contracts or other
statutorily required protections. 254 And even when officers are found guilty
in civil court and substantial damages are imposed, the officers are
indemnified entirely by taxpayers and usually never pay a dime. 255
According to Justice Russell Anderson, “the legislature, not the court, has the power to
determine when, or if, an attorney should be awarded attorney fees against unsuccessful
litigants.” Irwin, 599 N.W.2d at 145 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., dissenting). There are
exceptions to the rule, of course. See, e.g., Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319
N.W.2d 26, 33 (Minn. 1982) (“An exception to this rule arises in situations in which the
defendant’s wrongful act thrusts the plaintiff into litigation with a third person.”).
See generally MARY MULLEN, MINN. H.R. RSCH. DEP’T, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN
MINNESOTA STATUTES (2018), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/attyfee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C765-NNKG] (identifying well over 400 statutory provisions). One such
provision is the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.33, subdiv. 7
(providing that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs”).
See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012)
(detailing the various employment and labor laws that interfere with efforts of police reform).
Collective bargaining agreements are one source for arbitration protections, but there is
wide variability on where precisely in state law arbitration protections reside. See Stephen
Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 551 (2019) (“These
procedures are often articulated not just in state statutes or municipal codes, but also in
department-specific police union contracts.”). Minnesota police officers’ rights to collective
bargaining and arbitrate disputes over discipline are both creatures of statutory law. See
MINN. STAT. § 179A.06, subdiv. 2 (“Public employees have the right to form and join labor
or employee organizations.”); MINN. STAT. §§ 179A.20-.21 (outlining arbitration rights).
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 960 (reviewing the policies and practices of eighty-one different
police departments and finding that “officers almost never contribute anything to settlements
and judgments in police misconduct suits”). Most of the indemnification requirements stem
from state law. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 466.07, subdiv. 1 (“Subject to the limitations in
§ 466.04, a municipality or an instrumentality of a municipality shall defend and indemnify
any of its officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, for damages, including
punitive damages, claimed or levied against the officer or employee.”); MINN. STAT. § 3.736,
subdiv. 9(a) (“The state shall defend, save harmless, and indemnify a peace officer who is
not acting on behalf of a private employer and who is acting in good faith under § 629.40,
subdivision 4, the same as if the officer were an employee of the state.”). Yet Professor
Schwartz found that “[g]overnments satisfied settlements and judgments in police
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Both arbitration and indemnification are deeply embedded across
nearly every police department in the country. Some other mechanism must
come into play to remove problem officers and create incentives for all
officers to comport with good practices. While it is still relatively obscure,
individual liability insurance, unheard of for police officers, creates
important accountability in other professions, such as medicine and law, and
could fill the gap that arbitration and indemnification have carved into police
officer accountability. 256

1.

Arbitration Protections and the Inability to Fire Problem Officers

Failure to fire police officers who are clearly unfit for duty can
have significant ripple effects. Officers with serious past misconduct remain
on the force despite numerous complaints against them, and they are likely
at a higher risk of killing suspects. Derek Chauvin had seventeen
misconduct complaints against him during his nineteen years as a
Minneapolis policeman before he killed George Floyd. 257 Chauvin joins a
long list of officers involved in killing suspects who already had multiple
complaints filed against them. 258 Garrett Rolfe, who shot and killed Rayshard
Brooks just two weeks after Mr. Floyd was killed, had twelve complaints. 259
misconduct cases even when indemnification was prohibited by statute or policy.” Schwartz,
supra note 34, at 890. Indemnification even covered officers who had been fired or criminally
prosecuted for the conduct in question. Id.
See Deborah Ramirez, Marcus Wraight, Lauren Kilmister, & Carly Perkins, Policing the
256

Police: Could Mandatory Professional Liability Insurance for Officers Provide A New
Accountability Model?, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 407, 412 (2019) (“Our hope is that just as drivers

with established histories of reckless driving can be priced off the road by insurance
premiums, so too, the most dangerous officers might be forced into another profession.”).
As Professor Ramirez and her colleagues explain, “The idea has the advantage of being
market-based, aligning the financial interests of individual officers, police departments,
municipalities, and insurance companies towards safer policing . . . [and] has the added
benefit of not being solely punitive; officers with histories indicating their professionalism
and excellence can be financially rewarded with lower premiums.” Id.
Stephen Montemayor, Jennifer Bjorhus & Matt McKinney, Even To Friends, Former
Officer Derek Chauvin Was An Enigma, Star Trib. (Aug. 8, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/those-who-know-derek-chauvin-say-they-would-not-havepredicted-his-killing-of-george-floyd/572054552/ [https://perma.cc/R6UF-9QCC].
Of course, complaints are not the only measure of misconduct, and most civil rights
verdicts against officers are not part of an officer’s record. Judith A.M. Scully, Rotten Apple
257

258

Or Rotten Barrel?: The Role Of Civil Rights Lawyers In Ending The Culture Of Police
Violence, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 137, 150–52 (2008) (finding that civil rights settlements are
not kept on the personnel files of problem officers, which could reflect a clean record but
multiple § 1983 claims).
Curtis Gilbert, Atlanta Cop Who Killed Rayshard Brooks Had Prior Controversial
Shooting,
APM
Reps.
(June
17,
2020),
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2020/06/17/officer-garrett-rolfe-atlanta-shooting
[https://perma.cc/L39J-BAYY].
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Jason Van Dyke, who shot and killed seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald
in Chicago, had twenty-two complaints against him. 260 Daniel Pantaleo, the
NYPD officer who used a fatal choke hold on Eric Garner, had seven
disciplinary complaints and fourteen individual allegations lodged against
him. 261 These officers are not mere outliers. Emerging research supports the
logical assumption: officers with multiple complaints are higher risks for
future misconduct. 262
The current system actually protects officers—who, in most other
professions, would lose their jobs—and keeps those officers in a position to
inflict deadly force. Former Boston Police Commissioner William Evans
explained the predicament police leadership faces: “he can’t hire the
officers he wants, promote those who share his values, effectively discipline
errant officers, and he can’t fire them, or if he did, he risks having the
decision overturned.” 263 A former police chief explained that “in nearly nine
years as chief . . . , [he] had 16 cops out of 650 whom [he] felt should be
fired. Four [he] actually did fire. The Civil Service Commission promptly
reversed [him] on three of them.” 264 This same problem exists in Minnesota.
In the past eight years in Minneapolis, “9 of every 10 accusations of
misconduct were resolved without punishment or intervention aimed at
changing an officer’s behavior.” 265 After receiving approximately 3,000 total

Michael Lansu, Former Chicago Cop Jason Van Dyke Sentenced to 81 Months in Prison
2014
Murder,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Jan.
18,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/18/686391662/former-chicago-cop-jason-van-dyke-to-besentenced-for-laquan-mcdonald-murder [https://perma.cc/6T27-49CN] (noting Chicago
police records show that at least twenty-two complaints had been filed against Van
Dyke before he shot McDonald).
Danika Fears, Cop Who Fatally Choked Eric Garner Had Long List of Complaints, N.Y.
POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/03/21/cop-who-fatally-choked-eric-garnerhad-long-list-of-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/UJ6E-MFDC].
Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to
Predict Police Misconduct, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 225, 227 (2019) (finding that past
civilian allegations predict future misconduct). Researchers reviewed more than 50,000
civilian complaints against officers in Chicago and determined that “[t]he worst one percent
of officers, as measured by civilian allegations, generate almost five times the number of
payouts and over four times the total damage payouts in civil rights litigation.” Id.
Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 411.
Daniel Oates, I Used to Be a Police Chief. This Is Why It’s So Hard to Fire Bad Cops,
Wash. Post (June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/12/i-usedbe-police-chief-this-is-why-its-so-hard-fire-bad-cops/ [https://perma.cc/UQ8H-F3GW].
Reade Levinson & Michael Berens, Special Report: How Union, Supreme Court Shield
Minneapolis Cops, REUTERS (June 4, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/usminneapolis-police-culture-specialrep/special-report-how-union-supreme-court-shieldminneapolis-cops-idUSKBN23B2LL [https://perma.cc/Z497-6JW8].
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complaints against Minneapolis police officers during that period, only five
officers were fired. 266
Arbitration puts a startling number of fired officers back on the
job. 267 In Minnesota, approximately half of all officers fired since 2013 got
their jobs back through arbitration. 268 Those who were returned to work by
arbitrators included one officer who was fired for “kicking an unarmed suspect
who was already on the ground being attacked by a police dog,” another officer
for “repeatedly punching a handcuffed . . . man in the face,” and a third officer
for “failing to write up nearly four dozen cases, copying a judge’s signature onto
search warrants[,] and lying during the investigation.”269 As the Minnesota
Supreme Court acknowledged, even conduct that “[n]o doubt many
observers would find . . . disturbing” is not sufficient if an arbitrator decides
the officer should be back on the job. 270 Under our current system, even the
most miscreant officer can get their job back from an arbitrator. 271
Id. As one example, Officer Blayne Lehner was fired “for violating the department’s use
of force policy after video showed him repeatedly throwing a woman to the ground while
responding to a domestic disturbance.” Id. Officer Lehner had more than thirty complaints
during his eighteen-year career. Id. Despite his conduct and past complaint, an arbitrator
overturned the termination of his employment and reduced the penalty to a forty-hour
suspension without pay. Id.; see also Mark Iris, Unbinding Binding Arbitration of Police
Discipline: The Public Policy Exception, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 540, 545 (2013) (detailing how an
arbitration reversal required the St. Paul police to reinstate a convicted sex offender to the
force).
Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery, & Steven Rich, Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often
Forced to Put Officers Fired for Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/
[https://perma.cc/HEF3-WJDZ] (describing data collection efforts that found a significant
proportion of American law enforcement officers terminated by their police departments are
ordered to be rehired on appeal by arbitrators).
Jon Collins, Half of Fired Minnesota Police Officers Get Their Jobs Back Through
Arbitration,
MINN.
PUB.
RADIO
(July
9,
2020),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/07/09/half-of-fired-minnesota-police-officers-get-theirjobs-back-through-arbitration [https://perma.cc/D8MC-9KEU] (“Since 2013, independent
arbitrators in Minnesota have ruled about half the time that police officers who were
terminated should get their jobs back or receive lesser discipline.”).
Jennifer Bjorhus, Fired Minnesota Officers Have a Proven Career Saver: Arbitration, STAR
TRIB.
(June
21,
2020),
https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-cops-fired-thenrehired/571392702/ [https://perma.cc/XY6Q-WGZD].
City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., 923 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2019). In
October 2015, a Richfield police officer, who had previously been disciplined for how he
used force, was fired for striking a teenager in the head during a traffic stop. Collins, supra
note 268. The officer had also pushed the teenager twice and used profanity. Richfield, 923
N.W.2d at 39. Three and a half years later, the court upheld the arbitrator’s ruling to give
the officer his job back, despite the “disturbing” nature of the behavior. See id. at 42 (“But
state statute requires arbitration, and the City’s contract with the Union gives the arbitrator
the authority to decide what constitutes just cause for termination.”).
See Rushin, supra note 254, at 550 (documenting numerous cases of officers who were
given their jobs back despite serious misconduct). As Professor Rushin concludes, “police
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This process not only puts problem officers back at their job, but it
makes their supervisors less likely to impose disciplinary sanctions in the
first place. 272 As Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo explained,
“There is nothing more debilitating to a chief from an employment matter perspective, than when you have grounds to terminate an officer for misconduct,
and you’re dealing with a third-party mechanism that allows for that employee to
not only be back on your department, but to be patrolling in your communities.” 273 The process also “can have a corrosive effect on police discipline and
morale, telling the misbehaving officers they may continue their misconduct
without fear of adverse action, while undermining the morale of those who
adhere to police regulations and ethical norms.” 274 Nevertheless, most
departments continue to include arbitration provisions in their police union
contracts. 275
Not surprisingly, city officials from all across Minnesota made
arbitration one of their main targets for reform during last summer’s special
disciplinary appeals have forced communities to rehire police officers deemed unfit for duty
by their supervisors.” Id. at 550–51; see also Iris, supra note 266, at 544 (examining
numerous studies and concluding that arbitrations often overturn “disciplinary actions,
grounded in conduct which chiefs of police and presumably the public at large would find
simply unacceptable”); Martha Bellisle, Police in Misconduct Cases Stay on Force Through
Arbitration,
AP
NEWS
(June
24,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/d098a19c1c34749d763fd57a721d9e1d [https://perma.cc/BP8KG97P] (collecting examples, including an Oregon police officer who “lost his job and then
returned to work after fatally shooting an unarmed Black man in the back[, a] Florida
sergeant [who] was [fired] six times for using excessive force and stealing from suspects[, and]
a Texas lieutenant [who] was terminated five times after being accused of striking two women,
making threatening calls[,] and committing other infractions”).
Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2211–
12 (2014) (“An officer’s ability to contest adverse employment actions makes supervisors less
likely to impose disciplinary sanctions because while a supervisor faces a possible headache
for not disciplining a misbehaving subordinate, they face a certain headache if they do.”).
Bjorhus, supra note 269. The process makes it less likely that problem officers will be
fired. Minneapolis Assistant Chief Mike Kjos explained, “The fact that firing an officer could
end up in arbitration—and be reversed—weighs on decisions to officially terminate.” Id.
Iris, supra note 266, at 546.
See generally Rushin, supra note 254 (drawing on a dataset of 656 police union contracts
to show that the overwhelming majority of these contracts provide officers with the option to
appeal disciplinary action to arbitration and provide officers with other protections on
appeal). In addition to providing unusually strong appeal mechanisms, police unions have
other distinctive features. See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120
COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1335–36 (2020) (“In many ways, police unions flout both traditional
assumptions about organized labor and contemporary framings of the new labor movement.
Where unions often swing left, police unions swing right. Where much modern labor
organizing focuses on low-wage workers, police unions protect higher-wage professionals.
Where unionism and antiracism sometimes have travelled hand-in-hand, police unions still
represent predominantly white workers and frequently take public stands that are hostile to
racial justice or that express outright racism.”).
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legislative sessions. 276 The Mayor of Minneapolis, Jacob Frey, stated, “If the
legislature is serious about deep, structural police reforms, this is the most
impactful change they could make.” 277 The St. Paul Police Chief Todd
Axtell recommended making arbitration decisions more easily appealed. 278
Coon Rapids Police Chief Brad Wise testified that “there’s nothing worse, in my
view, for an organization than to lose an arbitration. . . . [I]t makes police leaders
be reluctant to even let cases go to arbitration for fear of losing them.” 279 Duluth
Police Chief Mike Tusken testified that serious misconduct cases erode public
trust and to maintain that trust “[w]e need a process in which there is a fair
outcome.” 280
Despite calls for broader reform, the changes passed last summer
provided only a minor tweak to the arbitration system in Minnesota and left
in place arbitrators’ largely unlimited authority to reinstate officers fired for
Erik Misselt, interim executive director of the Peace Officers Standards and Training
Board, told the media that arbitration is an issue “we hear a lot about. Chiefs have made it
pretty clear that is one of the things they want the Legislature to address.” Star Tribune
Editorial Board, Police Arbitration System Needs an Overhaul, STAR TRIB. (June 26, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/police-arbitration-system-needs-an-overhaul/571511992/
[https://perma.cc/P85G-Y2DM]. St. Paul Mayor Melvin Carter submitted a statement joining
several Twin City area mayors in calling for major arbitration reform. See MSR News Online,
276

Frey, Arradondo, and MN Mayors Call on Legislators to Fix Arbitration Process for Law
Enforcement, MINN. SPOKESMAN-RECORDER (June 18, 2020), https://spokesman-

recorder.com/2020/06/18/frey-arradondo-and-mn-mayors-call-on-legislators-to-fixarbitration-process-for-law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/CD3Y-UXZW] (quoting Mayor
Carter as saying, “This moment demands decisive action. Reforming arbitration is critical to
ensuring we can hold officers who betray our trust accountable.”).
Coulter Jones & Louise Radnofsky, Many Minnesota Police Officers Remain on the Force
Despite Misconduct, Wall St. J. (June 25, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/manyminnesota-police-officers-remain-on-the-force-despite-misconduct-11593097308
[https://perma.cc/3WPZ-G4C3].
Emma Nelson, St. Paul Police Chief Defends His Officers, Calls for Arbitration Reform,
STAR TRIB. (June 25, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/chief-axtell-defends-st-paul-policecalls-for-arbitrationreform/571488382/#:~:text=Paul%20police%20chief%20defends%20his%20officers%2C%
20calls%20for%20arbitration%20reform,St.&text=A%20month%20to%20the%20day,a%20Minneapolis%20police%20officer%2C%
20St.&text=Paul%20would%20need%201%2C600%20officers,a%20sworn%20force%20of
%20630. [https://perma.cc/3BG5-4NGM]. Specifically, the Chief told the City Council that
“he would like to see a new arbitration process that would allow the department to appeal
overturned firings in court.” Id.
Star Tribune Editorial Board, supra note 276. Chief Wise added that losing an arbitration
“creates distrust within the workplace . . . and saps the confidence of a police leader.” Id.
Id. Incidentally, Chief Tusken’s great-aunt was Irene Tusken, who had claimed to have
been raped by six Black circus workers in 1920 which set in motion the Duluth lynchings.
Dan Kraker, ‘We Never Solved the Problem’: Echoes of 1920 Duluth Lynching Persist At
Centennial,
MINN.
PUB.
RADIO
(June
15,
2020),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/06/15/we-never-solved-the-problem-echoes-of-1920duluth-lynching-persist-as-city-marks-centennial [https://perma.cc/CJS8-C7EG].
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misconduct. Under the new law, arbitrators in police officer employment
disputes will be selected directly by the Commissioner of the State Bureau
of Mediation Services, not the parties to the dispute, as before. 281 The
Commissioner, “in consultation with community and law enforcement
stakeholders,” will appoint a roster of six arbitrators who can only serve as
arbitrators in police grievance arbitrations. 282 Arbitrators are selected
through an alphabetical rotation. 283 The arbitrators will be required to attend
training on cultural competency and implicit bias, as well as training on the
“daily experience of peace officers, which may include ride-alongs with onduty officers or other activities that provide exposure to the environments,
choices, and judgments required of officers in the field.” 284 But the main
concern of the chiefs and mayors—that arbitration undermines their
authority to fire problem officers—was not addressed. Not surprisingly, city
leaders complained that the change was too insignificant and would hinder
police chiefs’ ability to “effectively address individual officer behavior.” 285

2.

The History of Personal Liability Insurance for Officers as an
Idea

In response to the impact of indemnification and arbitration,
academics and community activists have proposed mandatory personal
liability insurance for police officers. Initial credit for this idea goes to
Professor Noel Otu of the University of Texas at Brownsville, who
suggested mandatory professional liability insurance for police in 2006. 286
Professor Otu proposed that all police officers should be required to carry
“occupational liability insurance” so that financial liability for misconduct
See MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 11 (2020) (“The parties shall not participate in,
negotiate for, or agree to the selection of an arbitrator or arbitration panel under this
section.”).
Id. subdiv. 4. In selecting the six arbitrators, the Commissioner may consider a “candidate’s
familiarity with labor law, the grievance process, and the law enforcement profession; or
experience and training in cultural competency, racism, implicit bias, and recognizing and
valuing community diversity and cultural differences.” Id.
Id. subdiv. 11 (“The commissioner shall assign or appoint an arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators from the roster to a peace officer grievance arbitration under this section on
rotation through the roster alphabetically ordered by last name.”).
Id. subdiv. 10(a)(1)–(2) (“(1) at least six hours on the topics of cultural competency, racism,
implicit bias, and recognizing and valuing community diversity and cultural differences; and
(2) at least six hours on topics related to the daily experience of peace officers, which may
include ride-alongs with on-duty officers or other activities that provide exposure to the
environments, choices, and judgments required of officers in the field.”).
Bailey & Bella, supra note 7 (quoting Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey).
Noel Otu, The Police Service And Liability Insurance: Responsible Policing, 8 INT’L J. OF
POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 294, 309 (2006); see also Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 439
(reporting how related ideas on this from both academics and community activists “originates
in [Professor Otu’s] article.”).
281
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was removed from departments and cities and placed squarely on the
officer’s liability insurance. 287 Currently, no state or municipality has a
liability insurance requirement for their police officers. However, as part of
its significant police reform legislation last summer, Colorado passed a bill
that makes officers personally liable for up to $25,000 in damages in lawsuits
related to misconduct. 288
Professor Deborah Ramirez at Northeastern University Law
School and her colleagues (who are all recent graduates of Northeastern)
recently “dust[ed] off” Professor Otu’s idea and updated it in some
important ways. 289 They proposed that the municipality cover the base
premium for all officers, but individual officers might have to cover their
own costs if they are assessed a surcharge because of being a higher risk
(e.g., for having past complaints of misconduct). 290 In other words, “[o]fficers
with histories that create a higher premium would be responsible for paying
the difference between their premium and the departmental average.” 291
This would give insurance companies “leverage over both the whole
department and over individual officers.” 292
But academics are not the only ones suggesting this novel
approach. 293 Activists in Minnesota have been calling for liability insurance
for years, 294 and they came close to getting it on the ballot in Minneapolis.
Professor Otu also proposed that officer salaries be increased to cover the basic liability
insurance premium. Otu, supra note 286, at 309.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-21-131 (4) (West 2020) (requiring that an officer to pay 5% or
$25,000, whichever, is less, toward any judgment or settlement if the officer’s employer
determines that the officer “did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief that the
action was lawful”). For other aspects of the Colorado police reform bill, see supra notes
197-210 and accompanying text.
Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 411.
Id. at 455. This is similar to the proposal by activists in Minneapolis. See infra notes 294–
96 and accompanying text.
Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 455.
Id. at 455 (“Should the department adopt safer policies, like mandatory de-escalation
training, the average officer base premium would be reduced. Similarly, insurance companies
can tie premium reductions to specific trainings and programs that are shown to lower risk
and liability, giving individual officers a direct incentive to seek out such trainings.
Departments and individual officers alike would face a simple choice: recoup the financial
benefits of reducing risk or bear the cost of being less risk averse.”).
Similar ideas were floated in the Chicago City Council and the Maryland State Legislature
but did not get very far. Id. at 439. The New York Senate proposed a similar bill last summer.
N.Y. S.B. 8676 (N.Y. 2020), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2019/S8676
[https://perma.cc/6CW7-2RBH].
Michelle Gross, president and founder of Communities United Against Police Brutality
and co-founder of The Committee for Professional Policing, came up with the idea in 2010.
287
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Carla Murphy, A Push to Make Cops Carry Liability Insurance in Minneapolis, CHI. REP.
(June 27, 2016), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/a-push-to-make-cops-buy-liabilityinsurance-in-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/8QEV-UMBZ]. According to Gross, “It’s using
market forces to motivate individual cops to change police culture.” Id.
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In July 2016, a now-defunct community group, the Committee for
Professional Policing, submitted a petition to the Minneapolis City Council
for a proposed amendment to the city charter to be placed on the
November 2016 general election. 295 The proposed amendment would have
required Minneapolis police officers to obtain and maintain professional
liability insurance coverage. 296 The proposed amendment was ultimately
rejected by the City Council as being contrary to state law, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the Council’s decision. 297
Yet in the wake of the George Floyd killing, Communities United
Against Police Brutality, Minnesota’s Council on American-Islamic
Relations, and two Black Lives Matter chapters re-introduced the idea of
mandatory liability insurance for individual officers, among other
recommendations. 298 Steven Belton, president and CEO of the Urban
The group collected more than 7,000 signatures. Susan Du, Group Wants Minneapolis
to Carry Liability Insurance, CITY PAGES (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://www.citypages.com/news/group-wants-minneapolis-police-to-pay-for-their-ownliability-insurance-8182566 [https://perma.cc/L4VR-GN4Y]. The group tried three times to
get the measure on the ballot, 2014, 2015, and 2016. Id. The group was formed in 2014 by
Citizens United Against Police Brutality (“CUAPB”), a long-time community organization
working to address police brutality. FLYER, CONCERNED ABOUT MINNEAPOLIS POLICE
BRUTALITY? HELP US! (on file with author).
The proposed additional text to the city charter included the following:
Each appointed police officer must provide proof of professional
liability insurance coverage in the amount consistent with current limits
under the statutory immunity provision of state law and must maintain
continuous coverage throughout the course of employment as a police
officer with the city. Such insurance must be the primary insurance for
the officer and must include coverage for willful or malicious acts and
acts outside the scope of the officer's employment by the city. If the City
Council desires, the city may reimburse officers for the base rate of this
coverage but officers must be responsible for any additional costs due to
personal or claims history. The city may not indemnify police officers
against liability in any amount greater than required by State Statute
unless the officer’s insurance is exhausted. This amendment shall take
effect one year after passage.
TEXT OF PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT SUBMITTED VIA PETITION BY THE COMMITTEE
FOR PROFESSIONAL POLICING, July 26, 2016 (on file with author).
Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W.2d 304, 315 (Minn. 2017). According to the
court in a per curiam decision, the charter amendment would: (1) add requirements that are
absent from existing state law on municipal insurance requirements, such as designating the
officer’s required coverage as “primary”; (2) include provisions that permit what state law
forbids, such as relieving the City of its liability for torts committed in the scope of the officer’s
employment until the officer’s insurance coverage is first “exhausted”; and (3) amend
provisions to forbid what state law expressly permits, such as purchasing insurance coverage
for acts for which the City would otherwise be immune. Id. at 315.
Amy Forliti & Mohamed Ibrahim, Some Minneapolis Activists Doubt Disbanding the
Police
Will
Work,
Associated
Press
(June
8,
2020),
https://apnews.com/56a32b17f029abd750bfd58927ec5563 [https://perma.cc/49DZ-CB28].
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League Twin Cities, specifically criticized the reforms passed in July for “not
includ[ing] a requirement that law enforcement officers carry their own
personal liability insurance . . . [which] creates an incentive for officers to
check themselves.” 299 Unlike the efforts in 2016, however, this time activists
are targeting the Minnesota State Legislature. 300

3.

Indemnification – Taxpayers, Not Police Officers, Pay for Police
Misconduct

One key assumption in our legal process is that liability in civil court
will incentivize better police conduct. 301 The U.S. Supreme Court has said
that the fear of paying judgments creates important incentives for officers to
follow the law. 302 The Court relies on this assumption for its qualified
immunity jurisprudence. 303 In Pierson v. Ray, the same case in which the
In addition, Black Lives Matter Cleveland included the idea in its list of 10 demands for
accountability of Cleveland law enforcement last summer. Amanda VanAllen, Black Lives
Matter Cleveland Has a 10-point Proposal for Better Policing in Cleveland, News 5
Cleveland (June 5, 2020), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/america-in-crisis/blacklives-matter-cleveland-has-a-10-point-proposal-for-better-policing-in-cleveland
[https://perma.cc/X325-Q783].
Bjorhus & Van Oot, supra note 12.
Tiffany Bui, What to Do About the MPD? How Three Activist Groups Are Rethinking
Public Safety, MinnPost (July 1, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/metro/2020/07/what-todo-about-the-mpd-how-three-activist-groups-are-rethinking-public-safety/
[https://perma.cc/99T7-KC7B] (reporting that “CUAPB’s latest iteration for this measure
appeals to the Minnesota Legislature instead”).
See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2005)
(“Ordinarily, the threat of liability for compensatory damages also gives the defendant
an incentive to behave in the manner required by the standard of care.”).
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983) (“[W]e assume, and hope, that most officials are
guided primarily by the underlying standards of federal substantive law—both out of devotion
to duty, and in the interest of avoiding liability for compensatory damages.”).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions about Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 479, 495–96 (2011) (observing that in its qualified immunity analysis, “the Court
relied heavily on the assumption that officials, absent immunity, would face the threat of
personal liability for constitutional violations committed in the ostensible performance of
their official duties”); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (“When officials
are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may
well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways
that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide
their conduct. In this way, exposing government officials to the same legal hazards faced by
other citizens may detract from the rule of law instead of contributing to it.”). Of course, the
Court has articulated other justifications for qualified immunity for police officers. See, e.g.,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity
doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive
discovery.’”); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances
two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.”).
299
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Court introduced the concept of qualified immunity, the Court explained
its rationale for protecting officers from judgments: “A policeman’s lot is not
so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of
duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted
in damages if he does.” 304
Federal courts generally seem to believe that police officers have to
pay for whatever damages are assessed against them in civil rights cases. 305
Jurors may believe the same thing, particularly in the Eighth Circuit, which
has prohibited lawyers from telling jurors that police do not have to pay for
judgments against them. 306 The Eighth Circuit has made clear that it is
prejudicial to clarify for the jury that the government will pay damages, and
not the officers, because it “could result in an overly generous award of
damages.” 307
But police do not pay for the judgments against them in civil rights
cases, undermining a core assumption that civil liability for misconduct will
incentivize better police behavior. As Professor Joanna Schwartz found in
her recent study, “governments paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars
that plaintiffs recovered in lawsuits alleging civil rights violations by law
enforcement.” 308 Police officers paid $0 toward the $3.9 million in total
punitive damages. 309 Many officers paid nothing whatsoever, regardless of
the type of judgment. 310 Governments paid for police officer damages even
when indemnification was prohibited by statute or policy, when officers
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials'
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 79 (1999) (“Although federal officials do
not in practice pay the costs of defending themselves or compensating the victims of
constitutional violations, the federal courts have not accounted for that reality. The courts
instead have taken the fiction of individual liability seriously, acting as if individual officials
continue to bear the costs of litigation and liability personally.”).
Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052, 1058 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. As the court explained, “We see no distinction between this and the injection of
testimony or argument concerning insurance, however. We believe that the jury’s
apprehension that the government would be responsible for paying damages could result in
an overly generous award of damages.” Id. Minnesota state courts have a similar restriction
on informing juries about insurance or indemnification. See Purdes v. Merrill, 268 Minn.
129, 135, 128 N.W.2d 164, 168 (1964) (“We have discussed in numerous cases the
impropriety of referring to the subject of insurance coverage by counsel in arguments to the
jury.”); see also Hon. Peder B. Hong, Summation at the Border: Serious Misconduct in Final
Argument in Civil Trials, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 179, 188 (1995) (“Counsel must avoid undue,
unwarranted references to whether or not either party to an action is insured. This type of
misconduct, if not cured, may result in a new trial.”).
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 890.
Id. Note that in Professor Schwartz’s study, she found that one officer was required to pay
a $300 punitive damages award, but that officer ended up never paying anything. Id. at 918.
Id. (“And officers in the thirty-seven small and mid-sized jurisdictions in my study never
contributed to settlements or judgments in lawsuits brought against them.”).
304
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were disciplined, and when officers had been terminated by the department
or criminally prosecuted for their conduct. 311 With nearly no financial stake
in these lawsuits, officers, therefore, have “little financial incentive to correct
course.” 312

4.

Specific Legislation for Professional Liability Insurance

Several representatives of the Minnesota House of
Representatives proposed a bill last July to require liability insurance for
Minnesota police officers. 313 As a first step, the proposed bill would
eliminate mandatory indemnification by the employing city that is now
provided under Minnesota Statute sections 466.03 and 466.07. 314 Next, the
proposed legislation would require liability insurance for each police officer
in the state. 315 Officers would have to cover any additional costs of insurance
due to misconduct or other factors that raise their premiums, and police
departments would be permitted to reimburse the officer “for the base rate

One example Professor Schwartz shares is particularly egregious:
Another example concerns the case brought by the estate of Kathryn
Johnston, a 92-year-old Atlanta woman who was shot and killed by
Atlanta police officers after they illegally raided her home. Officers
involved in the shooting later admitted that they planted marijuana in
Johnston’s home after her death and submitted as evidence cocaine that
they falsely alleged had been purchased at her home. Three officers
pleaded guilty to offenses related to the shooting and coverup. They
were sentenced to between five and ten years in federal prison and were
ordered to pay $8180 restitution--the cost to bury Johnston. Another
nine officers were fired or disciplined, or resigned, following the
incident. The City of Atlanta paid $4.9 million to settle the civil suit
brought by Johnston’s estate. No officers contributed to the settlement.
Id. at 923–24.
Megan Quattlebaum & Tom Tyler, Beyond the Law: An Agenda for Policing Reform, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1023–24 (2020).
Representatives Jay Xiong, Kaohly Her, Aisha Gomez, Fue Lee, and Hodan Hassan
311

312

313

authored the bill during the second special session. H.R. 87, 91st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess.
(Minn. 2020).

Under current Minnesota law, cities must indemnify their police officers. MINN. STAT.
§ 466.07, subdiv. 1. The proposed bill would eliminate that requirement. See H.R. 87, 91st
Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. ll. 1.12–1.14 (Minn. 2020) (“Neither the officer’s employing agency
nor any other individual or organization, public or private, may assume liability in lieu of the
officer or the officer’s insurance . . . .”); see also id. at l. 1.20 (adding the language “other
than licensed peace officers” to 466.07, subdiv.1, exempting police from the indemnification
requirement). In addition, the proposed legislation stated that any settlements would remain
public data (even if between private individuals). Id. at ll. 1.15–1.16.
See id. at ll. 3.18–3.24 (“Each licensed peace officer shall obtain a policy of professional
liability insurance coverage in an amount no less than current limits for municipalities as
provided in § 466.04.”).
314

315
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of the policy required by this subdivision, but may not cover any additional
premium costs due to personal or claims history.” 316

5.

Why Insurance Could Work

There are several compelling arguments as to why a market-based
insurance program could reduce police misconduct. For starters, problem
officers might have trouble maintaining their position because they are no
longer insurable. 317 This has already played out for small communities where
the cost or inability to get liability coverage has led to the closure of entire
police departments, mainly because of lawsuits. 318 The same could be true
for officers whom insurers refuse to insure or place such high premiums on
their continued service that they can no longer afford to be police officers. 319
In this fashion, insurers in a compulsory insurance environment serve
“effectively as quasi-regulators” and provide a way to screen and filter

Id. at ll. 3.24–3.26.
See, e.g., Communities United Against Police Brutality, What Will It Take to End Police
Violence?
Recommendations
for
Reform
(2020),

316
317

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cuapb/pages/1/attachments/original/1591595256/
WHAT_WILL_IT_TAKE_TO_END_POLICE_VIOLENCE_with_Appendices.pdf?15
91595256 [https://perma.cc/Q6QL-CV8N] (“Some of the worst offenders—likely including
ex-Officer Derek Chauvin—would become uninsurable and then would no longer be able to
work as police officers.”).
Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 443–44. Communities cited include Lincoln Heights,
Ohio; Maywood, California; Oakley, Michigan; Sorrento, Louisiana; Niota, Tennessee; King
City, California; and Port Marion, Pennsylvania. Id. These police departments were
considered uninsurable for a wide range of misconduct, including rampant fraud, threats of
violence against a romantic partner, and exposing oneself on a previous job. Id. In these
circumstances, at least, the inability to purchase insurance has worked to eliminate problem
officers from service.
As the plaintiffs in Bicking explained, the proposed insurance amendment seeks to address
“the incorrigible and longstanding problem” of police misconduct by “applying the proven
risk management strategy of professional liability insurance.” Bicking v. City of Minneapolis,
891 N.W.2d 304, 312 n.7 (Minn. 2017). As Dave Bicking told National Public Radio, “We
have one officer [in Minneapolis] who’s had five significant settlements against him just in a
year and a half. Someone like that could never, ever buy insurance. They’d have to charge
him $60[,000]-$70,000 a year. That officer would be gone.” Martin Kaste, To Change Police
Practices, a Push for Liability Insurance in Minneapolis, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 26, 2016),
https://www.npr.org/2016/06/27/483420607/to-stop-police-lawsuits-reformers-want-officersto-getinsurance#:~:text=To%20Change%20Police%20Practices%2C%20A,Liability%20Insuranc
e%20In%20Minneapolis%20%3A%20NPR&text=Live%20Sessions,To%20Change%20Police%20Practices%2C%20A%20Push%20For%20Liability%20Insura
nce%20In,police%20misconduct%20complaints%20and%20lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/8HPT-QJAX].
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individuals who undertake important but potentially socially harmful
activities. 320
Relatedly, the impact of premium cost could deter bad behavior.
Professor Ramirez and colleagues use car insurance as a potential model,
and they collected data to support the notions that increasing premiums for
bad driving does bring accidents down and that higher costs of insurance
makes people more cautious. 321 And of course, if a person has been in too
many accidents for any insurance company to offer them car insurance, the
result is that they cannot buy insurance and thus legally cannot drive a car. 322
There is also the strong possibility that the insurance industry itself
could bring significant leverage to impose policies that improve policing
safety. The automobile industry is a good analogy for this, too. Car insurers
have fought the industry and government for stronger vehicle safety policies
for decades. 323 They were an early and strong advocate for airbags. 324 The
insurance companies have continued to work together to collect
information and conduct studies to improve safety. 325 More recently, car
Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law–A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 41
(2012) (describing such gatekeeping as a principal function of compulsory insurance
companies).
Ramirez et al., supra note 256, at 443–44 (collecting studies). Professor Ramirez and her
colleagues suggest that car insurance is a better model than malpractice insurance for lawyers,
in part, because most states do not require lawyers to carry malpractice insurance. Id. at 399.
Only two states currently require malpractice insurance for lawyers, and five states are
studying the issue. See Susan Saab Fortney, Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance:
Exposing Lawyers’ Blind Spots, 9 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 190, 193
(2019) (“Over the last two years, a few states have considered whether to join Oregon, and
now Idaho, in requiring malpractice insurance for practicing attorneys. Bar groups in
California, Washington, Nevada, New Jersey, and Georgia have studied the issue of
mandatory insurance coverage for attorneys.”).
Avraham, supra note 320, at 41.
See, e.g., Walter Rugaber, Industry Resists Car-Safety Costs , N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/06/archives/industry-resists-carsafety-costscompanies-feel-consumers-will.html [https://perma.cc/7PUZ-R6JU] (describing the coalition
of insurance companies working with Ralph Nader to require air bags among other safety
provisions). The insurance companies took the fight all the way to the Supreme Court and
won. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) (reinstating the original air bag requirement). Of course, Ralph Nader and
the auto insurers were not always on the same side. Alan Fram, Auto Insurers, Consumer
Activists Square Off Over California Proposition, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 6, 1988),
https://apnews.com/7fa6fd19854c43e897ba3be7db263f74 [https://perma.cc/9PHP-4ECF]
(quoting Nader’s testimony to Congress, “Insurance customers will be standing up for their
rights against unreasonable insurance rates, arbitrary practices[,] and lobbying pressure by
insurance companies and their corporate allies to take away victims’ rights.”).
See generally Robert Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61 J. RISK
& INS. 107 (1994) (documenting the decades-long strategy and motivation of the auto insurers
to fight for air bags).
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 222 (2012) (describing, as one example, the
320
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insurers successfully fought for “graduated driver licensing” laws (under
which driving privileges are introduced gradually) and published ratings of
state highway safety laws. 326
Insurance providers who provide insurance to entire police
departments have similarly had some positive impact on policing. 327 Current
municipal insurance providers already provide a number of “lossprevention” measures to the police departments they cover, including policy
development, education and training, accreditation, and auditing. 328 Insurers
have also successfully imposed their influence on the firing of problem
officers, 329 and they have even seen to the reconstitution of entire
departments due to widespread officer misconduct. 330
As Professor John Rappaport explained, “the insurer may be better
positioned than the government to reform police behavior.” 331 Compared to
government oversight agencies, the insurer
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “a nonprofit organization wholly funded by the auto
insurance industry . . . whose stated goal is to reduce the losses from highway crashes” and
whose claim to fame is “testing and rating the crashworthiness of new automobiles as they
come on the market”).
Id. at 222–23 (citations omitted).
See generally John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 1539, 1543 (2017) (arguing that insurance risk management encourages better
policing practices). By using market-based incentives, “an insurer writing police liability
insurance may profit by reducing police misconduct.” Id. at 1543–44. Because an insurer
has significant power over the police department, it has the “the means and influence
necessary” to “regulate” the police. Id. at 1544. Insurance “has probably been the source of
the most far-reaching yet deep reforms in American policing over the past three decades.”
Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow, & Doug Mellom, Federal Civil
326
327

Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects
of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.

9, 41 (2016).
Rappaport, supra note 327, at 1574–86 (detailing the many efforts insurers use to reduce
the incidence and magnitude of police misconduct); White et al., supra note 327, at 40
(noting that “insurance companies would not offer attractively priced policies if police
agencies could not demonstrate that they had done everything possible to reduce the risk of
lawsuits”).
See, e.g., Rachel B. Doyle, How Insurance Companies Can Force Bad Cops off the Job,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
10,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/insurance-companies-police/529833/
[https://perma.cc/V2JG-TH44] (reporting that “[i]n 2010, a police chief in Rutledge,
Tennessee, was fired to appease the town’s liability insurer after assault allegations were
leveled against him”).
Radley Balko, How the Insurance Industry Could Reform American Policing, WASH.
POST,
(Mar.
1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2016/03/01/how-the-insurance-industry-could-reform-american-policing/
[https://perma.cc/K42B-4PF2] (including, among other examples, “[t]he town of King City,
California, [which] had to rebuild its police department from scratch after reports of cops
operating a towing scheme against low-income Latin[x] drivers”).
Rappaport, supra note 327, at 1544.
328
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may possess superior information, such as data that cut
across myriad police agencies; deeper and more nimble
resources, including ‘boots on the ground’ and the capacity
to develop harm-prevention technologies; market
incentives that favor good, but not overzealous, riskmanagement policies; and the flexibility to develop and
prescribe individualized risk-reduction plans. 332
The profit motive in such a market-based structure can create powerful
incentives for insurance companies to impose reform on police
departments. 333 Departments usually listen. 334
But general insurance at the municipal level is not enough. To the
extent that general insurance for municipal police departments can have
positive impacts on policing policy, any such benefits typically do not reach
the larger municipalities. Larger city police departments, Minneapolis and
St. Paul, in particular, are self-insured. 335 The larger police departments not
only miss out on any positive influence from an outside insurance provider
(which might push for reforms), but they also lack any sort of riskmanagement structures. 336 Indeed, Professor Carol Archbold surveyed the
354 largest municipal agencies about their risk-management programs, and

332

Id. at 1544.

As Professor John Rappaport explains:
When the insurer assumes the risk of liability, it also develops a financial
incentive to reduce that risk through loss prevention. By reducing risk,
the insurer lowers its payouts under the liability policy and thus increases
profits. An effective loss-prevention program can also help the insurer
compete for business by offering lower premiums.
Id. at 1543.
See id. at 1596–97 (“To the extent that researchers have identified successful strategies for
combating police misconduct, insurers have been reasonably effective at inducing police
agencies to use them,” including effective policies on vehicle pursuits, the use of force and
other high-risk conduct, and the use of body-worn cameras and training simulators.).
Furst & Webster, supra note 28. To self-insure, Minneapolis sets aside money each year
in its budget to cover any anticipated legal judgments. Miguel Otárola, Minneapolis
Taxpayers Will Feel Effect of Record $20 Million Settlement, STAR TRIB., (May 10, 2019),
https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-taxpayers-will-feel-effect-of-record-20-millionsettlement/509756012/ [https://perma.cc/8XZH-QA5D]. The city contracts with a thirdparty actuarial firm annually to determine appropriate premium charges; the May 28 cash
balance in the self-insurance fund was approximately $96 million. Judy Greenwald, Group
Presses for Police Insurance Reform: Minneapolis Self-Insured, BUS. INS. (June 10, 2020),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200610/NEWS06/912335052/Grouppresses-for-police-insurance-reform-Minneapolis-self-insured#
[https://perma.cc/X28E7CR6].
Rappaport, supra note 327, at 1597 (noting that “the Chicagos and New Yorks may do
surprisingly little loss prevention”).
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only fourteen of the 354 employed an in-house risk manager (most were
presumably self-insured). 337

C.

Proposal No. 3: Expand Minnesota’s Deadly-Use-of-Force Statute 338 to
Include What Officers Did (or Did Not Do) Before They Used
Deadly Force
1.

Current Standards Are Inadequate

Current deadly use of force standards have not sufficiently curtailed
police-involved killings. Only a tiny fraction of the officers that kill suspects
are prosecuted, and an even smaller number are convicted. 339 In Minnesota,
no police officer had been convicted out of nearly 200 police-involved
deaths since 2000 until Somali-American Officer Mohamed Noor was
convicted of third-degree murder in 2017 (the victim, notably, was
White). 340 This is very likely “the first time a Minnesota police officer has
been convicted of murder for an on-duty shooting.” 341 Until the killing of
George Floyd, only one other police officer in Minnesota had been charged
Id. (citing CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
LEGAL ADVISING 62, 77–79 (2004)). Based on her research, Archbold concluded that “risk
management programs are still in the infancy stage of being embraced by police agencies,”
and that “the vast majority of the over 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country
have no outside reviewers to assist with accountability efforts.” Id. at 1597–98.
MINN. STAT. § 609.066 (effective Mar. 1, 2021).
Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (Oct. 3,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DN8S-GXNN] (providing examples of high-profile police killings across
the country that did not result in charges or convictions against the officers including Lamar
Anthony Smith in 2011, Sylville Smith in 2016, Philando Castile in 2016, Terence Crutcher
in 2016, Freddie Gray in 2015, Samuel DuBose in 2015, Eric Garner in 2014, Michael
Brown in 2014, Tamir Rice in 2014, Sandra Bland in July 2015, and Alton Sterling in 2016).
As researchers at FiveThirtyEight found last summer, “despite the increased scrutiny on
police violence since 2014 (when the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and
the Black Lives Matter movement raised public awareness of the issue), neither the number
of officers charged nor the number of convictions has meaningfully increased.” Amelia
Thomson-DeVeaux, Nathaniel Rakich, & Likhitha Butchireddygari, Why It’s So Rare for
Police Officers to Face Legal Consequences, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 4, 2020)
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-still-so-rare-for-police-officers-to-face-legalconsequences-for-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/7PWX-WPHD] (analyzing data from the
Henry A. Wallace Police Crime Database).
Rachel M. Cohen, After a Black Cop Was Convicted of Killing a White Woman,
Minnesota Activists Say Focus Should Be Police Reform, THE INTERCEPT (May 2, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/02/minnesota-police-convicted-justine-damond/
[https://perma.cc/M6TZ-ZX35].
Amy Forliti, Conviction for Minneapolis Cop Prompts Questions About Race,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 1, 2019), https://apnews.com/f87950f2f05243fbaa7a93bb1f826f1a
[https://perma.cc/P8K7-JZAJ].
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for killing a suspect in recent history—Jeronimo Yanez, a Latino officer, who
was later acquitted of manslaughter in the 2016 death of Philando Castile. 342
Similarly, police officers nationwide rarely get charged for the
deaths of those in their custody. 343 Over the last several years, police killed
on average about 1,000 people each year in the United States. 344 A staggering
number, particularly when compared to other countries. 345 While more
White suspects have been killed overall, Black and Indigenous suspects are
significantly more likely to be killed by the police. 346 Despite thousands of
342

Id.

MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ [https:/perma.cc/C62LZYX9] (database updated as of Oct. 28, 2020) (99% of police killings from 2013-2019 have
not resulted in officers being charged with a crime).
John Sullivan, Liz Weber, Julie Tate & Jennifer Jenkins, Four Years in a Row, Police
Nationwide Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000 People, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/four-years-in-a-row-police-nationwide-fatallyshoot-nearly-1000-people/2019/02/07/0cb3b098-020f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/N77Z-5BRC] (reporting that approximately one thousand people die
annually from police shootings). Mapping Police Violence’s data, which is gathered from
public databases and law enforcement records, also shows that the number of police killings
varied by year from 2013 to 2019 but did not fall significantly overall—in that span, the
number of killings fell to a low of 1,050 in 2014, and had a high of 1,143 in 2018. MAPPING
POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 343; Fatal Force, WASH. POST (updated Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/
[https://perma.cc/95VQ-34UC]; Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and
Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 955 (2020) (compiling data on fatal
police shootings).
Jamiles Lartey, By The Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days Than Other Countries Do
in Years, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries [https://perma.cc/CMF829PM] (comparing the number of police shootings in the U.S. with those in the United
Kingdom, Australia, Iceland, Germany, Canada, and Finland and concluding that “America
is the outlier—and this is what a crisis looks like”). For example, in England and Wales (with
one-sixth the population of the U.S.), there were fifty-five fatal police shootings in the twentyfour years between 1990 and 2015, and there were fifty-nine fatal police shootings in the U.S.
in the first twenty-four days of 2015. Id.
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases, 2018 WIS.
L. REV. 369, 376 (2018) (finding that over the two-year period of 2015–2016, African
Americans and Native Americans were respectively 2.5 times and 2.7 times more likely to
be killed by police than Whites). The disparity may be even higher for unarmed suspects.
See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of
Prevention?, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 907, 910 (2019) (“Unarmed African-American individuals are
3.5 times more likely to be shot by police than unarmed [W]hite persons.”); see also Ann C.
Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement Officers
Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2018) (collecting studies
suggesting that Persons of Color were far more likely to be shot and killed by police officers
than Whites). The disparity is even more pronounced in Minneapolis. See Matt
Furber, John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch , Minneapolis Police, Long Accused of Racism,
Face
Wrath
of
Wounded
City,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
27,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/XM5F343
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police killings since 2005, only 110 officers have been charged with murder
or manslaughter in an on-duty shooting, 347 and only 42 of those officers have
been convicted. 348

2.

Minnesota’s Most Recent Reforms

Minnesota took substantial steps last summer to strengthen its
standards with respect to deadly use of force by police. Minnesota’s previous
standard essentially “boiled down to a ‘subjective’ perception about whether
an individual officer felt threatened.” 349 The key for prosecutors when
contemplating whether to charge officers was what an officer believed
subjectively at the time the deadly force was used. 350 As a group of local
criminology and criminal justice professors concluded, “[i]f an officer ‘feels’
threatened, regardless of whether or not they are, deadly force is justified.” 351
In their view, “the law gives officers wide discretion and makes it difficult to
prosecute and charge officers.” 352 After the trial of Officer Yanez for the
shooting of Philando Castile, jurors specifically “pointed to the law
authorizing police to use deadly force to explain their decision to find Yanez
XUAW] (“Black people accounted for more than 60 percent of the victims in Minneapolis
police shootings from late 2009 through May 2019, data shows.”).
Thomson-DeVeaux et al., supra note 339 (analyzing data from the Henry A. Wallace
Police Crime Database). This data does not include killings that did not involve shooting,
but setting aside the killing of George Floyd, deaths not involving guns are quite rare. Id.
See id. (“Fifty were not [convicted] and 18 cases are still pending. . . . [M]any of these
convictions ended up being for a lesser offense—only five of these officers were convicted of
murder (and did not have that conviction overturned).”).
Gina Erickson, Sarah Greenman, Jillian Peterson & Shelly Schaefer, Break the Cycle: Five
Changes in Minnesota Policing That Can Be Enacted Right Now, MINNPOST (June 2, 2020),
https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2020/06/break-the-cycle-fives-changes-inminnesota-policing-that-can-be-enacted-right-now/ [https://perma.cc/44GA-TQZL] (legal
analysis of Minnesota’s deadly use-of-force statute by associate professors of criminology and
criminal justice at Hamline University).
Indeed, in his decision not to charge the officers in the fatal shooting of Isak Aden, Dakota
County Attorney James Backstrom concluded that because “it was objectively reasonable for
these five police officers to subjectively believe Aden posed a deadly threat to other officers
at the scene of this incident at the time they fired their service weapons and, therefore, they
were legally justified in using deadly force in this instance.” LEGAL CHARGING STATEMENT
OF
JAMES
BACKSTROM,
DAKOTA
CTY.
ATT’Y
(Nov.
13,
2019),
https://www.co.dakota.mn.us/LawJustice/AttorneyNewsReleases/Pages/Eagan-AndBloomington-Police-Officers-Were-Legally-Justified-In-Using-Deadly-Force-In-ShootingDeath-Of-Isak-Aden.aspx [https://perma.cc/DAG6-DEER]. Hennepin County Attorney
Mike Freeman similarly refused to charge the officers in the death of Jamar Clark because
Officer Schwarze “reasonably believed” that Clark was lethal threat to the arresting officers.
David A. Graham, No Charges in the Shooting of Jamar Clark, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/03/no-charges-in-the-shooting-ofjamar-clark/476031/ [https://perma.cc/V22A-EM25].
Erickson et al., supra note 349.
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not guilty.” 353 One of the jurors in the Yanez trial lamented the result and
challenged the public to “go after the law.” 354 Removal of the subjective
standard became one of the major components in the reform efforts last
summer. 355
The reforms passed in July 2020 included numerous changes to
the deadly use of force standards. In addition to outlawing choke holds and
other dangerous restrictive holds, 356 it also established a legislative intent that
deadly force must be “exercised judiciously” and “for the sanctity of every
human life.” 357 Importantly, the reforms also enhanced reporting on the use
of force, 358 adding the requirement that officers intervene when present and
observing the excessive use of force by another officer. 359 Lastly, the use of
Jon Collins, Law Gives Officers Wide Discretion in Deadly Force Incidents, MINN. PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/08/14/police-shootingsprompt-discussion-of-deadly-force-laws [https://perma.cc/YHA5-P8NQ].
Tom Weber, Yanez Juror: “Nobody Was OK with It,” MINN. PUB. RADIO (June 23,
2017),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/06/23/74-seconds-yanez-juror
[https://perma.cc/74RG-KERB].
Brian Bakst, Deadly Force Law a Key Issue in Capitol Policing Debate, MINN. PUB. RADIO
(June 17, 2020), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/06/16/deadly-force-law-a-key-issue-incapitol-policing-debate [https://perma.cc/JJ6Y-ZUJ9]. During a legislative hearing last
summer, Representative Rena Moran explained, “We’ve heard . . . before from law
enforcement officers that said, ‘Well, I feared for my life or I was scared.’ . . . This makes
prosecuting and gaining a conviction extremely difficult.” Mara Gottfried, Would Proposed
Changes to MN Law Bring More Charges Against Officers? Probably Not, Attorneys Say,
PIONEER PRESS (June 13, 2020), https://www.twincities.com/2020/06/13/lawmakers-weighuse-of-deadly-force-as-they-consider-police-reform-in-wake-of-george-floyds-death/
[https://perma.cc/BY8J-KB7J].
MINN. STAT. § 609.06, subdiv. 3 (2020). Importantly, the definition of “choke hold”
includes “applying pressure to a person’s neck on either side of the windpipe, but not to the
windpipe itself, to stop the flow of blood to the brain via the carotid arteries.” Id. subdiv.
3(b). In addition to choke holds, the new bill prohibits “tying all of a person’s limbs together
behind the person’s back to render the person immobile” and “securing a person in any way
that results in transporting the person face down in a vehicle.” Id. subdiv. 3(a)(2), (3).
MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 1(a) (effective Mar. 1, 2021).
See MINN. STAT. § 626.5534 (2020) (“A chief law enforcement officer must provide the
information requested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation about each incident of law
enforcement use of force resulting in serious bodily injury or death, as those terms are
defined in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s reporting requirements, to the
superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.”).
MINN. STAT. § 626.8475 (2020). Just days before the second special session, Twin Cities
law enforcement officials sent a letter to legislative leaders urging them to pass a requirement
that officers intervene when witnessing other officers using excessive use of force, among other
suggested reforms. Dana Ferguson, Police Reforms Among the Issues Legislators Expected to
Take Up When They Return to the Capitol, PIONEER PRESS (July 10, 2020),
https://www.twincities.com/2020/07/10/police-reforms-among-the-issues-legislatorsexpected-to-take-up-when-they-return-to-the-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/CXD4-P75H]. The
letter was signed by Ramsey County Attorney John Choi, Hennepin County Attorney Mike
Freeman, St. Paul Police Chief Todd Axtell, Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arrandondo,
and Minnesota Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington. Id. St. Paul Police had already
353
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force reforms removed the subjective belief standard and replaced it with
that of an objectively reasonable officer. 360 Now an officer can only use
deadly force “if an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on
the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without
the benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary . . . to protect the peace
officer or another from death or great bodily harm.” 361

3.

Problems with Minnesota’s New Deadly Use of Force Standard

a.

Reasonableness is Not a Reasonable Way to Hold Police
Accountable

The change in Minnesota’s use of deadly force statute improved
the standard but did not go far enough. Objective reasonableness of an
officer’s beliefs alone does not get at the full picture. 362 It relies too heavily
on viewing the circumstances from the officer’s perspective and restricts the
time frame to the seconds before the officer uses deadly force. 363 A more
comprehensive analysis of what led to the police shooting is needed—a
standard that includes the officer’s pre-deadly force actions, and not just the
officer’s beliefs at the moment deadly force was employed.
As a preliminary matter, there is a problem generally with any
standard of review that relies on the “reasonableness” of an officer’s belief. 364
required their officers to intervene “to prevent the use of excessive force.” ST. PAUL POLICE
DEP’T MANUAL, POLICY 246.01, II. (updated Feb. 25, 2020).
See MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 2(a) (effective Mar. 1, 2021) (“[T]he use of deadly
force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only if an objectively reasonable officer
would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and
without the benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary . . . .”).
360

361

See id.

Even the determination of what is “reasonable” is problematic. Mawia Khogali, Redefining
Standards of Excessive Force: Implications for Policy and Practice, 12 S. J. POL’Y & JUST.
105, 137 (2018) (“[A]long with the possibility that perceptions of ‘reasonableness’ vary across
different departments and individual officers, there is evidence that officers’ ability to
perceive situations objectively is obstructed when they are prepared to fire a gun.”).
Part of the issue may be “the popular perception that law enforcement is extremely
dangerous work and that police officers are under constant threat of attack.” John P.
Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers,
21 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 155, 167–68 (2016). People generally are wrong about this. As
Professor Gross found, “While law enforcement can be dangerous, those dangers have been
greatly exaggerated. The reality is that more police officers are killed accidentally by motor
vehicles than are fatally shot.” Id. at 168. Without minimizing the risks to law enforcement,
it is important to keep in mind that “[b]eing a truck driver, construction worker, or a roofer
is more dangerous than being a police officer.” Id.
This is the standard used in most states. See Steven M. Salky & Joshua A. Levy, Reforming
Police Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, THE CHAMPION 52 (June 2020) (providing a brief
summary of the current number of states using objective reasonableness as the deadly use of
force standard).
362
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The term “reasonableness” is too much of “an open-ended standard” to
provide sufficient guidance to the jury deciding whether an officer’s deadly
use of force was justified. 365 Jurors can struggle with the concept of
reasonableness in the context of police behavior, in particular. 366 The
Supreme Court has clouded the matter by suggesting officers be given
deference and that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” 367 Jurors have followed this guidance and are reluctant to hold
police accountable. 368 It can be difficult for jurors to find that an officer’s
beliefs were unreasonable when they too often accept the testimony of
police as more believable than the testimony of others. 369 As a result, “almost
any use of deadly force can appear to be reasonable.” 370
Lee, supra note 39, at 654–55. The Court acknowledged the messiness and lack of any
real standard. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“[W]e must still slosh our way
through the fact bound morass of “reasonableness.”).
Khogali, supra note 362, at 109 (noting that “it is not exactly clear what constitutes ‘objective
reasonableness’ . . . [since] the definition of a reasonable officer is equivocal [and given]
hundreds of thousands of police officers in the U.S., perceptions of ‘reasonableness’ may
not be universally similar”).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). As Professor John Gross points out,
“the Court did not say that police officers should be shown some amount of deference in
their decision making when the situation they are in actually is ‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving,’ but simply because they are often placed in such situations.” Gross, supra note
363, at 158–59 (citations omitted, emphasis added). In such circumstances, “[t]here is an
understandable desire of jurors to give officers the benefit of the doubt, especially when making
split-second decisions in what they perceive as life-threatening circumstances.” Erwin
Chemerinsky, Opinion, Police Dodge Accountability for Deaths, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Dec. 7,
2014),
https://www.ocregister.com/2014/12/07/erwin-chemerinsky-police-dodgeaccountability-for-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/3D3G-FNQ9].
Justice Burger recognized the reluctance of jurors to hold police accountable forty years
ago. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
421 (1971) (Burger, J. dissenting) (“There is some validity to the claims that juries will not
return verdicts against individual officers except in those unusual cases where the violation
has been flagrant or where the error has been complete.”); see also Ramirez et al., supra note
256, at 420 (“[J]urors do not believe that police officers who have mistakenly perceived a
deadly threat and thus mistakenly used deadly force are criminals. Jurors think of these cases
as instances where a police officer doing a dangerous job made a mistake in the line of duty.
They often empathize with an officer who had to make an unexpected split-second life-ordeath decision.”).
German Lopez, Cops Are Almost Never Prosecuted and Convicted for Use of
Force, VOX, (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938234/policeshootings-killings-prosecutions-court [https://perma.cc/J52Z-DN9U]. Part of what makes
police more believable to jurors may be that “police are also trained and skilled narrators of
observed conflicts and also skilled witnesses and advocates.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN
POLICE KILL 181 (2017).
Gross, supra note 363, at 176.
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A second problem is that reasonableness, while sounding
objective, often incorporates negative stereotypes. 371 Racial bias, for
example, can impact juror perception of whether an officer’s beliefs were
“reasonable” in two related ways. 372 First, jurors might find an officer’s beliefs
“reasonable” because they do not notice (or do not care) that the officer’s
beliefs were motivated by racist assumptions. 373 The reasonableness
standard often turns on whether the quick thinking of an officer was
reasonable in light of circumstances, and such “mental shortcuts” can trigger
racial bias by an officer. 374 Second, jurors might act on their own racial biases
in determining whether it would be reasonable to use force, particularly
when the victim of the force is a Person of Color. 375 Whether implicit or
Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth
Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 187 (2008) (arguing that standards like
371

reasonableness “have always been assigned a race (White), a gender (male), and a class
(wealthy)”).
See generally Shawn E. Fields, Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931, 980 (2019)
(detailing the long and disturbing history of White fear of People of Color and concluding
that “implicit bias inevitably affects factfinding analyses”).
See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 74 (1993) (“[M]any White Americans are quite
insensitive to cues of prejudiced behavior in others.”).
Former FBI Director James Comey explained, in rather unfiltered terms, how the process
can work inside the minds of police officers:
A mental shortcut becomes almost irresistible and maybe even rational
by some lights. The two young Black men on one side of the street look
like so many others the officer has locked up. Two White men on the
other side of the street—even in the same clothes—do not. The officer
does not make the same association about the two White guys, whether
that officer is White or Black. And that drives different behavior.
Remarks by James Comey, Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race
[https://perma.cc/69JS-74J2]. Professors L. Song Richardson and Phillip Goff describe how
quick thinking often triggers a “suspicion heuristic” where “perceiving race – even absent
racial animus – can influence judgments of criminality beyond conscious awareness.” L. Song
Richardson & Phillip A. Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 293, 307 (2012). The “Black-as-Criminal Stereotype” can influence the officer’s belief
in the need to shoot, especially given that heuristics are often relied on to “reduce complex
decisions to simpler assessments.” Id. at 298. Police officers, like others, can experience
“attentional bias” when they see Black faces, and this is “driven by stereotypic associations
that [officers] are not even aware are operating on [them]” but are based on the false
equivalence between being African American and being a criminal. JENNIFER L.
EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT SHAPES WHAT WE
SEE, THINK, AND DO 60–61 (2019).
See Fields, supra note 372, at 980 (reporting that “implicit bias inevitably affects factfinding
analyses”). Racism on the part of White jurors, in particular, is nothing new. See, e.g., Natalie
A. Spiess, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending
War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV. 809, 825 (2018) (“A wealth of research has also found
that juries are more likely to convict People of Color than Whites, even when the facts in
two separate cases are identical.”); see also Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How
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explicit, “racist beliefs continue to factor into jury deliberations.” 376 As a
result, applying a standard of reasonableness can “fail[] to effectively protect
Persons of Color by allowing racial bias to influence an officer’s use of
deadly force.” 377
Even after the modest reforms passed last summer, Minnesota’s
state policing standards are still behind local law enforcement policies for
deadly use of force by officers. For example, St. Paul requires its officers to
first try to de-escalate conflict and limits authorized use of force to situations
involving an “imminent” threat. 378 Minneapolis requires its officers to
consider all reasonable alternatives before using deadly force. 379 Minnesota’s
state government should be pushing departments to do more, not the other
way around.

b.

Minnesota Law Lags Behind Current Policies of Local Police
Departments

The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of at
least keeping up with the policies of local law enforcement in the context of
the use of deadly force in particular. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court
emphasized the importance of reviewing actual police practice when
considering what constitutes a reasonable use of deadly force. 380 The Court
overturned a longstanding common law rule that permitted any amount of
force, including deadly force, to stop a fleeing felon, after examining “the
sweeping change in the legal . . . context.” 381 The Court found that examining
Much Do We Really Know About Race & Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory &
Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1010 (2003) (“[S]ubstantial evidence exists to support

the conclusion of many legal scholars that, at least under some conditions, White jurors
exhibit racial bias in their verdicts and sentencing decisions.”).
Kathryn E. Miller, The Attorneys Are Bound and the Witnesses Are Gagged: State Limits
on Post-Conviction Investigation in Criminal Cases, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 135, 172 (2018).
Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U.
L. REV. 951, 999–1000 (2020). As Professors Fagan and Campbell note, “Without rethinking
the reasonableness standard, persons who are perceived to be dangerous on account of their
race . . . will remain at risk.” Id.
ST. PAUL POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 246.01 IV (de-escalation), 246.00 VII.B (2020).
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 5-301 III.B.3 (2020) (“Officers shall not
use deadly force except in accordance with MN Statute § 609.066, and [adding] even in those
circumstances officers shall first consider all reasonable alternatives including less lethal
measures, before using deadly force.”). Minneapolis also requires officers to de-escalate and
reduce the use of force “immediately as resistance decreases or control is achieved.”
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 5-301 III.G.4 (2020).
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985) (citing numerous studies of police department
regulations).
See id. at 13 (“Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance
on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes
of a historical inquiry.”).
376
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the reasonableness of officer conduct required consideration “[i]n light of
the rules adopted by those who must actually administer them” and noted
that “[a]ctual departmental policies are important.” 382
The reverse is true, too. Changes in the law can impact police
department policy. After the Garner decision, numerous departments
improved their internal policies. 383 In a survey of police departments in the
100 most populous U.S. cities about their policy response to the Garner
decision, over thirty percent had changed their deadly force policies as a
result of Garner. 384 The other seventy percent had already instituted policies
at least as restrictive as what Garner required. 385 Even in departments that
were already in compliance with Garner, stronger policies were enacted
beyond what even Garner required. 386 As research has shown, “individual
police department rules . . . generally place a more restrictive standard of
conduct than permitted by law.” 387 The impact of these adjustments to
department policies, prompted by the change in the law from Garner, led
to a significant reduction in police homicides. 388

4.

Deadly Use of Force Restrictions Need to Include the Actions or
Inactions of the Officers that Take Place Before the Use of
Deadly Force, not Just Their Beliefs

Actions (and inactions) by officers are often just as important as the
reasonableness of their beliefs. The Supreme Court’s concern that “police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments” 389 overstates how
Id. at 19. Not every department was ahead of the law, however. See Abraham N.
Tennenbaum, The Influence of the Garner Decision on Police Use of Deadly Force, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 244 (1994) (“[A]ctual police departments’ policies before
[Garner] varied significantly not only from state to state, but also within each state.”).
See id. at 260 (“[T]he Garner decision demonstrates that a decision can have a strong effect
on police behavior.”).
Samuel Walker & Lori Fridell, Forces of Change in Police Policy: The Impact of
Tennessee v. Garner, 11 AM. J. POLICE 97, 101 (1992). State legislatures, however, were less
enthusiastic about following Garner’s lead. See James J. Fyfe & Jeffery T. Walker, Garner
382

383

384

Plus Five Years: An Examination of Supreme Court Intervention into Police Discretion and
Legislative Prerogatives, 14 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 177 (1990) (concluding that of the twentytwo states that Garner impacted, only four amended their statutes to comply with the ruling).
Fyfe & Walker, supra note 384, at 177.
Jerry R. Sparger & David J. Giacopassi, Memphis Revisited: A Reexamination of Police
Shootings After the Garner Decision, 9 JUST. Q. 211, 218 (1992) (“Even though Memphis’
policy before Garner was consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision, the police restricted
385
386

the policy even further after the decision.”).
Tennenbaum, supra note 382, at 256 (quoting KENNETH J. MATULIA, A BALANCE OF
FORCES: MODEL DEADLY FORCE POLICY AND PROCEDURE 17 (2d ed. 1985)).
See id. (finding that Garner led to a reduction in the total number of police homicides by
approximately sixty homicides a year (more than sixteen percent)).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
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common such circumstances arise. Law professor and former police officer
Seth Stoughton points out that “the realities of police violence are such that
the circumstances in which officers must make a truly split-second decision
are highly unusual.” 390 On the contrary, it is typically the officer who is the
first to use force. When a police officer uses force, it is usually done
“offensively to induce compliance, not defensively to protect their own
safety or the safety of an innocent bystander.” 391 Use of force standards,
therefore, should require officers to avoid taking actions that place them in
situations where they have no choice but to make split-second decisions. 392
Professor Cynthia Lee has put together an entire model use-offorce statute that recognizes the importance of the actions that officers take
before using deadly force. 393 Among other reforms to standards of deadly
use of force, 394 Professor Lee recommends directing juries to examine what
“pre-seizure conduct” officers took when evaluating whether the use of

Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 869 (2014). Despite the fact that
it describes only rare occasions, the phrase “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” has
become, inaccurately, “the accepted depiction of the environment in which police officers
use force.” Id. at 865. According to Professor Stoughton, since the Supreme Court first
introduced that description in 1989, federal district and circuit courts have repeated it on
more than 2300 occasions. Id.
Megan Quattlebaum & Tom Tyler, Beyond the Law: An Agenda for Policing Reform, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (2020); see also Stoughton, supra note 390, at 868 (“The vast
majority of the time, then, officers use force aggressively, not defensively.”).
PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 17 (recommending policies “to take steps
that help prevent officers from being placed in situations where they have no choice but to
make split-second decisions”).
See Lee, supra note 39, at 635 (“My model statute goes beyond current law by broadening
the time frame the law considers relevant when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s
use of deadly force.”). Professor Lee’s model statute has already been adopted by
Washington, D.C. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lethal Force Laws Re-Examined after Police
Killings; Is Reasonableness Standard Too Easy?, A.B.A. (June 19, 2020, 11:23 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lethal-force-laws-re-examined-after-police-killingsis-reasonableness-standard-too-easy [https://perma.cc/UAU8-5JVQ].
For example, tracking traditional self-defense law, Professor Lee includes the requirement
that the suspect posed an “imminent” threat of death or bodily injury to the officers or others.
See Lee, supra note 39, at 667 (“My model statute includes an immediacy requirement in
police use-of-force law for the same reasons that imminence is required in self-defense law.
If the suspect did not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or if it was
not immediately necessary to use deadly force against the suspect at the time the officer shot
him, then it is hard to say it was necessary at that moment to shoot him.”). Minnesota House
Democrats had hoped the new Minnesota reforms would have changed the threshold for
using deadly force to “imminent” from “apparent.” Jessie Van Berkel & Briana Bierschbach,
Minnesota Lawmakers Still Hope for Police Reforms, Public Works Bill, STAR TRIB. (July
8, 2020, 5:14 AM), https://www.startribune.com/legislature-getting-a-do-over-on-policereform-public-works/571662302/ [https://perma.cc/K2Y4-TQFD]; see MINN. STAT. §
609.066, subdiv. 2(a)(1) (effective Mar. 1, 2021) (“[T]o protect the peace officer or another
from apparent death or great bodily harm.” (emphasis added)).
390
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deadly force was justified. 395 Juries should also consider failure to take
actions that could “de-escalate” the circumstances that led to the use of
deadly force. 396 By broadening the time frame to look at a police officer’s
actions (or inaction) before the use of deadly force, Professor Lee hopes to
“influence police behavior before the moment in time when an officer is
fearing for his life.” 397 The point is not to require any particular conduct per
se, but to allow juries to consider what an officer did, or failed to do, that
led to the circumstances of the deadly use of force. 398

a.

Pre-seizure Conduct

Minnesota law should be amended so that the jury can consider
what actions the officer took before the incident that may have increased
the likelihood of the use of deadly force. Such “pre-seizure conduct,” 399
sometimes known as “officer-created jeopardy,” 400 asks to what extent did
Lee, supra note 39, at 635.
Id. According to “11 of the most significant law enforcement leadership and labor
organizations in the United States,” including the International Association of the Chiefs of
Police, de-escalation is “[t]aking action or communicating verbally or non-verbally during a
potential force encounter in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy
of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to resolve the
situation without the use of force or with a reduction in the force necessary.” National
Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
(Oct.
2017),
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/201808/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NNH-N77P].
See Lee, supra note 39, at 635. As Professor Stoughton explained:
If an officer steps in front of a car and then shoots the driver because
the car starts moving toward them, under this new law, the jury, the
judge, the prosecutor will analyze the propriety, the appropriateness of
the officer’s actions not just at the moment that the shots were fired but
also the officer’s actions leading up to the moment that the shots were
fired. And one of the questions there is whether the officer put
themselves into an unnecessarily dangerous situation and then used
force to address the danger that they should’ve avoided in the first place.
All Things Considered, Law Professor on California’s New Police Use-of-Force Law, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 24, 2019, 5:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/24/754052321/lawprofessor-on-california-s-new-police-use-of-force-law [https://perma.cc/JBR6-TYMH].
See Lee, supra note 39, at 670–71 (“Whether the officer engaged in de-escalation measures
prior to using deadly force is merely one factor for the fact finder to consider when assessing
the reasonableness of the officer’s actions . . . . If an officer does not engage in such measures,
the officer’s actions could still be considered reasonable.”) (citing Gardner v. Buerger, 82
F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[U]nreasonable police behavior before a shooting does not
necessarily make the shooting unconstitutional.”)).
Pre-seizure conduct refers to “conduct by the officer prior to the shooting that helped
create the dangerous situation or increased the likelihood that deadly force would need to
be used to protect the officer or others.” Lee, supra note 39, at 671.
“[Officer]-created . . . jeopardy . . . refers to a dangerous situation into which an officer
unnecessarily puts himself.” Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth
395
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the officer create the situation that led to the use of deadly force. 401 As
experts have pointed out, “a decision made early in an encounter, or even
before an encounter begins, when there is no time pressure, can avoid
putting officers into a position where they have to make a time-pressured
decision.” 402 For example, the Philadelphia Police Department instructs
officers to “ensure their actions do not precipitate the use of deadly force by
placing themselves or others in jeopardy by taking unnecessary, overly
aggressive, or improper actions.” 403
Many federal courts are already employing a similar test in Fourth
Amendment civil cases. The majority of circuits that have addressed the
issue have held that “police use of force is unreasonable if the police create
the situation that requires the police to use force.” 404 Police officers can be
culpable for the improper use of deadly force if they “set in motion a series
of events” that lead to the deprivation of constitutional rights.” 405 Even if an
officer reasonably believed that the officer’s life was in danger, the use of
deadly force is unreasonable if the officer “had unreasonably created the
encounter that led to the use of force.” 406 As the Ninth Circuit warned, “it is
Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 259 (2017); see also Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death
Resulted from “Officer-Created Jeopardy.” So Why Were No Officers Indicted?, SLATE

(Dec.
28,
2015,
5:19
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/12/28/tamir_rice_s_death_didn_t_lead_to_ind
ictments_because_of_supreme_court_vagueness.html
[https://perma.cc/4A8L-WRY5]
(explaining how the officers who killed Tamir Rice put themselves in a bad position prior to
killing him that likely led to their deadly actions).
Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the Chain of Events in Excessive Force
Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 22 (2017) (“[O]fficers should be liable for excessive force
when their conduct causes the justification for the force.”). The conduct of a police officer
“that precipitated the seizure matters, not just as context for understanding the seizure as an
isolated segment, but as context for understanding the entire chain of events.” Id.; see also
Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 288 (5th Cir. 2015)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part) (“At some point, an officer crosses the line between
setting up a risky situation and actually himself directly causing the ‘threat.’”).
Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 400, at 259.
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 10.1, USE OF FORCE - INVOLVING THE
DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS 6 (Sept. 18, 2015). According to the policy, “It is often a tactically
superior police procedure to withdraw, take cover or reposition, rather than the immediate
use of force.” Id.
Arthur H. Garrison, Criminal Culpability, Civil Liability, and Police Created Danger: Why
401

402
403

404

and How the Fourth Amendment Provides Very Limited Protection from Police Use of
Deadly Force, 28 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 241, 245 (2018) (finding that six of the eleven
circuits that have directly addressed the issue have so held); see also Armacost, supra note
346, at 986 n.275 (discussing circuit split).
Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 1075 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 137
S. Ct. 548 (2017) (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990)).
Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that that an officer’s
actions preceding a deadly shooting were not objectively reasonable because the officer
“enter[ed] the dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without
405

406

2020]

IMPROVING POLICE OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY

295

conceivable that some police officers could commit ‘homicide by selfdefense’ by unconstitutionally and intentionally provoking an attack so that
they could respond to it with deadly force.” 407
The proposed changes to the deadly-use-of-force statute require
an examination of the true “totality of circumstances,” which, in some useof-force jurisprudence, has included pre-seizure conduct. 408 But Minnesota’s
new statute is clear that the totality to be considered is merely “based on the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the
benefit of hindsight.” 409 This is consistent with how the Eighth Circuit
excludes pre-seizure police conduct to be used in the determination of
reasonableness: “[W]e scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events
leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” 410

b.

De-escalation

Of course, police may fail to act when doing so might eliminate the
need for deadly force. Just as they should examine what conduct officers
take in creating a dangerous situation, juries should similarly be able to
consider whether the officer failed to engage in de-escalation measures,
shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat”); see also Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60
F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that reasonableness of officers’ actions depends in
part on whether their own reckless or deliberate conduct during a seizure unreasonably
created the need to use deadly force); Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding that “[w]here a police officer unreasonably places himself in harm’s way, his use of
deadly force may be deemed excessive.”); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a police officer cannot get in front of a suspect’s car and then rely
upon the danger of the oncoming car to justify the use of deadly force); Young v. City of
Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (ruling that the court should
examine the actions of the government officials leading up to the seizure, and therefore
“police officers’ actions for our purposes need not be examined solely at the moment of the
shooting”). But see Sok Kong Tr. for Map Kong v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 993–94
(8th Cir. 2020) (reaffirming that in the 8th Circuit, the reasonableness of force depends on
the threat the person poses during the shooting, even if officers created the need for deadly
force through their own actions).
Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Cnty. of Los
Angeles, Cal. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
See, e.g., Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Obviously,
events immediately connected with the actual seizure are taken into account in determining
whether the seizure is reasonable.”).
MINN. STAT. § 609.066, subdiv. 2 (2020) (effective Mar. 1, 2021).
Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the police chase of a
fleeing tractor trailer was not relevant to the subsequent shooting of the driver). The court
explained that “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable
or ill-advised conduct in general.” Id. But see Gardner v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir.
1996) (finding that “unreasonable police behavior before a shooting does not necessarily
make the shooting unconstitutional.”). That court, however, also wisely noted, “[b]ut this
does not mean we should refuse to let juries draw reasonable inferences from evidence about
events surrounding and leading up to the seizure.” Id.
407
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including communication, using distance, cover, and time, and using less
lethal types of force, if feasible, prior to using deadly force. 411 Making deescalation a consideration for the jury would obviously “give[] officers an
incentive to engage in de-escalation measures and consider less deadly
alternatives before using deadly force” and could change police culture. 412
Experts in the field single out de-escalation tactics as a significant
opportunity to reduce police killings. 413 Indeed, many police departments
already require officers to use de-escalation tactics or use deadly force only
as a last resort, including the St. Paul Police and other major metropolitan
area departments. 414
Aside from the logical justifications, there are at least some signs of
demonstrated results. As Professor Lee reports, several cities “have seen a
marked reduction in the number of fatal police shootings after
implementing de-escalation measures.” 415 For example, Dallas saw a forty
PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 9. PERF’s fourth guiding principle on use
of force is adopting de-escalation as a formal agency policy. Id. at 40 (“Agencies should adopt
General Orders and/or policy statements making it clear that de-escalation is the preferred,
tactically sound approach in many critical incidents.”); see also PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK
FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 27, at 2 (“[L]aw enforcement agencies
should have clear and comprehensive policies on the use of force (including training on the
importance of de-escalation).”); INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 396, at 9
(“[T]he goal of de-escalation is to slow down the situation so that the subject can be guided
toward a course of action that will not necessitate the use of force, reduce the level of force
necessary, allow time for additional personnel or resources to arrive, or all three.”); STATE
OF MINN. WORKING GROUP, supra note 87, at 11 (“Require officers to de-escalate when
such effort does not compromise officer safety.”). The Department of Justice under
President Clinton recognized the value of de-escalation decades ago. See Principles for
Promoting
Police Integrity,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.
(Jan.
2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL3Y-VD86] (“[O]fficers
should assess the incident to determine which nondeadly technique or weapon will best deescalate the incident and bring it under control in a safe manner.”).
Lee, supra note 39, at 670.
PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 7 (reporting that leading police executives
believe that there is a “significant potential for de-escalation and resolving encounters by
means other than the use of deadly force” in as many as one-third of the annual total of fatal
officer-involved shootings).
See supra notes 378–79 and accompanying text (reference to St. Paul and Minneapolis
policies); see also SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL http://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/title-8---use-of-force/8000---use-of-force-core-principles
[https://perma.cc/SM8393JJ] (“When safe, under the totality of the circumstances, and time and circumstances
permit, officers shall use de-escalation tactics in order to reduce the need for force.”);
DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER § 906.01(C), USE OF DEADLY FORCE (2009)
(“Deadly force will be used with great restraint and as a last resort only when the level of
resistance warrants the use of deadly force.”) (emphasis added); see also PERF GUIDING
PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 5 (“de-escalation [strategies] are already in place in many police
agencies, and have been for years.”).
See Lee, supra note 39, at 669 (citing Dallas and Las Vegas, in particular). Cleveland is
another possible example. Its chief recently credited de-escalation training, among other
411
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percent drop in shootings by police and a sixty-four percent drop in
excessive force complaints against the department. 416 Las Vegas transformed
itself from a department with some of the highest rates of police killings to
a “model of police reform.” 417 Importantly, de-escalation tactics can also
protect officers’ lives too. 418
IV.

CONCLUSION

The police play a critical role in our society. For most citizens, the
police are by far the most visible members of our justice system, and “the
entire society suffers if their behavior violates the rule of law.” 419 Importantly,

reforms, for a dramatic drop in police killings. See Heather Gillers, For Many Police
Departments, De-escalation Training Is a Response, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2020, 3:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-many-police-departments-de-escalation-training-is-aresponse-11598470239 [https://perma.cc/4VGV-Z2RS ] (quoting Chief Williams that the
department has seen a “dramatic decrease in deadly force and then use of force in general
by our officers” between 2015 and 2019 compared with the previous four years); see also
Armacost, supra note 346, at 961 (“Police departments that have instituted de-escalation
training have reported drops in use-of-force incidents.”).
Dallas News Staff, Dallas Police Excessive-Force Complaints Drop Dramatically, DALLAS
MORNING
NEWS
(Nov.
16,
2015,
11:00
PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2015/11/17/dallas-police-excessive-forcecomplaints-drop-dramatically/ [https://perma.cc/T74J-Z8U7]. And “[i]t’s not just Dallas,
the Morning News reported; excessive force complaints have also fallen in Seattle,
Baltimore, and New York, among other major American cities.” Drake Baer, The Dallas
Police Force Is Evidence That ‘De-Escalation’ Policing Works, THE CUT (July 8, 2016),
https://www.thecut.com/2016/07/deescalation-policing-works.html [https://perma.cc/8QSEYDXA].
Daniel Hernandez, How One of the Deadliest Police Forces in America Stopped Shooting
People, QUARTZ (Dec. 4, 2015), https://qz.com/565011/how-one-of-the-largest-policeforces-in-america-stopped-shooting-people/ [https://perma.cc/RU82-N4MH].
PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 14 (“Rather than unnecessarily pushing
officers into harm’s way in some circumstances, there may be opportunities to slow those
situations down, bring more resources to the scene, and utilize sound decision-making that
is designed to keep officers safe, while also protecting the public. Through de-escalation,
effective tactics, and appropriate equipment, officers can prevent situations from ever
reaching the point where anyone’s life is in danger and where officers have little choice but
to use deadly force.”).
Morgan Cloud, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal
Justice System: Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1354
(1996). President Obama has written about the special role that police have in our society:
Police officers are the heroic backbone of our communities. They hold
significant civic and law enforcement responsibilities and put their lives
at risk to protect us each day, at times facing some of the most adverse
circumstances imaginable. As I have emphasized time and again, the
overwhelming majority of police officers are fair, dedicated, and honest
public servants who strive daily to cultivate and sustain positive
relationships with the communities they serve and protect.
416
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the police have, at times, been at the leading edge of reform. In the wake of
Mr. Floyd’s killing, fourteen Minneapolis police officers sent a letter to
“Everyone” condemning the unlawful acts of their colleagues and offering
support for change: “We stand ready to listen and embrace the calls for
change, reform, and rebuilding.” 420 Many more officers were willing to sign
the letter, but the group selected those fourteen officers to highlight the
broad diversity of voices on the letter. 421 In addition, police chiefs have
frequently pushed their departments to go beyond what is required by the
law. 422 These efforts are commendable, but the legal system can do far better.
Despite many promising signs of reform, systems for holding police
officers accountable are still broken. The courts are unable to provide the
degree of necessary oversight, and the Supreme Court and inadequate state
laws are largely at fault. The Supreme Court has greatly undermined § 1983
by continually expanding the nullifying effect of qualified immunity. Current
state employment and labor laws make taxpayers, not officers, pay for
judgments and settlements for police misconduct and make it too difficult
for police chiefs to fire officers unfit for duty. Inadequate state criminal law
has contributed to very few officers being charged and even fewer officers
being convicted of even the most obvious criminal acts. The recent attempts
at reform last summer by the Minnesota Legislature fell short of addressing
these deficiencies.
But the Legislature has many options to fix this. A state-based §
1983 law, carefully crafted to exclude qualified immunity and to include
attorney’s fees and vicarious liability, could restore the promise of the
original § 1983, this time under state law. Requiring officers to carry
individual liability insurance, just like lawyers and doctors, could leverage
market-based forces to weed out problem officers and create better
incentives for safer policing. Finally, expanding the deadly-use-of-force
statute to include what officers did (or did not do) before the moment they
Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 811, 840 (2017).
Melissa Alonso & Josh Campbell, Minneapolis Police Officers Pen Open Letter
Condemning Former Officer Derek Chauvin, CNN (June 13, 2020, 12:09 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/12/us/minneapolis-police-letter-chauvin-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/XA97-L3C5].
According to their spokesperson, “There were many more willing to sign, but the group
opted to showcase people from across the [department] as well as male/female, Black/White,
straight/gay, leader/frontline, etc. Internally, this is sending a message.” Id.
Mara H. Gottfried, St. Paul Police Reforms Were Underway for Years When George
Floyd Died in Minneapolis, PIONEER PRESS (June 25, 2020, 4:47 PM),
https://www.twincities.com/2020/06/25/police-chief-to-city-council-reforms-in-st-paulunderway-for-years-when-george-floyd-died-in-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/PS5C-HZH2]
(highlighting the reforms made in the St. Paul Police Department under Chief Todd Axtell);
see generally Adam Minter, Opinion, In the City of St. Paul, Police Reform Is Working,
STAR TRIB. (June 26, 2020, 11:41 AM), https://www.startribune.com/in-the-city-of-st-paulpolice-reform-is-working/571505322/ [https://perma.cc/5ALC-Z6WL].
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used deadly force, such as de-escalation and other pre-seizure conduct, will
hold more officers to account for deadly acts and put pressure on
departments to train and require officers to avoid situations where deadly
force is used.
These changes will not, of course, address the entire problem of
racism and police abuse, but increasing these measures for officer
accountability will make the court system a more useful tool for police
reform. The Minnesota legislature has stepped up in the past to provide a
model for the nation for addressing the scourge of lynching. But that was
100 years ago. It is time for Minnesota to act again.
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